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Abstract 
The paper analyzes exchange rate regimes implemented by the major Latin 
American countries since the Second World War, with special attention on the 
period of the second globalization process beginning in the 1970s. The analysis 
follows a historical narrative aiming to provide an understanding of the domestic 
and external circumstances in which various regimes were adopted. A simple 
conceptual framework is developed in order to emphasize how the exchange rate 
regime may affect key nominal and real variables in a small open economy. After 
an overview of the main trends followed by the major countries in the region over 
the last 60 years, the paper focuses on regimes that were implemented 1) with 
stabilization purposes (nominal anchors) and 2) with the aim of targeting the level 
of the real exchange rate. These two sections analyze in greater detail some 
experiences illustrating the pros and cons of both strategies. The paper closes with 
an assessment about exchange rate experiences in Latin America.  
 
 
JEL classification: F41, N16, F31. 
Keywords: Latin America, exchange rate regimes, real exchange rate, inflation targeting 
 
Roberto Frenkel 
Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad 
(CEDES) 
Sánchez de Bustamante 27, (C1173AAA) 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Martin Rapetti 
UMass, Amherst and CEDES 
Department of Economics  
Thompson Hall  
University of Massachusetts  
Amherst, MA 01003 
                                                
† This is an extended version of the chapter on Exchange Rate Regimes appearing in the Handbook of Latin 
American Economics, edited by José Antonio Ocampo and Jaime Ros. 
* We thank Leonardo Bleger, Oscar Dancourt, Leila Davis, Francisco Martínez Hernández, José Antonio 
Ocampo, Jaime Ros and Peter Skott for valuable comments and Emiliano Libman for superb research 
assistance. We also want to thank the SECyT (Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica, 
Programa de Modernización Tecnológica, contrato de préstamo BID 1728/OC-AR) and the Ford Fundation for 
financial support. 
2 
 
                                                
1. Introduction 
 
Latin American economic history is rich in cases of interest for macroeconomists. The 
region provides substantial material for the study of inflation, unemployment, financial 
and balance of payment crises, as well as episodes of rapid growth. A central goal of this 
paper is to present a persuasive argument showing that exchange rate policies and 
regimes have played a significant role in shaping many of these macroeconomic 
outcomes. We develop a historical narrative of the economic performance of Latin 
American countries since the Second World War. The analysis primarily focuses on 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, and pays special attention to the 
domestic and external conditions that these countries faced when making their 
exchange rate regime choices.  
Historical analysis is not the most practiced empirical strategy among economists. 
There are three main reasons why we chose it. First, we believe that a historical 
narrative is a concise and effective way to provide an overview of the main trends in 
exchange rate regime choice in Latin America. Second, historical analyses inform the 
reader about the circumstances in which choices were actually made. The literature on 
exchange rate regimes has made enormous contributions in identifying which regime 
performs better in any particular context. The results of those efforts have been 
primarily normative (e.g. the Mundell-Fleming result that fixed exchange rates are 
optimal when the economy is more exposed to nominal shocks). However, analyzing real 
world decisions through that approach is not always helpful, as choices can sometimes be 
constrained by specific circumstances that are ignored in these more abstract analyses. By 
describing the domestic and external contexts that Latin American countries faced in each 
period, we attempt to help understand some of the determinants of policy makers’ 
decisions.1 Finally, historical analyses provide valuable information and insights that are 
not captured in standard regression analysis (Durlauf, et al., 2005). Empirical studies on 
exchange rate arrangements have typically relied on regression analysis to evaluate the 
correlation between regimes and macroeconomic performance (e.g. economic growth, 
inflation, etc). In order to do so, exchange rate regimes need to be classified and then 
converted into a right hand variable (typically as a regime-specific dummy). Recent 
empirical work on exchange rate regimes has invested lots of effort in classifying exchange 
rate regimes in order to identify actual or de facto regimes -as opposed to the IMF’s de jure 
classification- and thus evaluate the correlation between exchange rate arrangements and 
1 Domestic political economy is one of these important elements. Our analysis does not go into the details of the 
political conditions in which decisions were made. For an analysis of the politics of exchange rates 
arrangements in Latin America see Frieden and Stein (2001).  
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macroeconomic performance.2 This methodological strategy can certainly provide relevant 
insights and information.3 One obvious problem, however, is that no two regimes are 
identical. Collapsing the various characteristics of an exchange rate regime into a single 
variable may entail the loss of important information. On the contrary, by describing the 
actual rules and behavior of the regimes, historical analyses provide rich information and 
yield results that can at least complement those obtained in econometric studies.  
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section 2 provides a simple 
conceptual framework to analyze the potential channels through which the exchange rate 
can influence macroeconomic performance. Section 3 gives an overview of the main trends 
of exchange rate arrangements in the major Latin American countries. This narrative goes 
from the post world war period up until the unfolding of the subprime crisis in the US and 
its effects on Latin America. The following two sections describe in greater detail what we 
see as paradigmatic examples of exchange rate regimes under capital mobility in the 
region. Section 4 discusses two cases in which the exchange rate was used exclusively as a 
nominal anchor. These are the Southern Cone tablitas during the late 1970s and the 
currency board in Argentina during the 1990s. Section 5 focuses on two cases of exchange 
rate regimes that aimed to target the real exchange rate. These experiences are the 
crawling bands in Chile between mid-1980s and mid-1990s and managed floating in 
Argentina after the 2002 crisis. Section 6 closes with the main conclusions derived from our 
analysis. The appendix at the end of the paper provides graphs plotting the real exchange 
rate in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru between 1980 and 2008. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework  
 
In a small open economy the nominal exchange rate (NER) is a key macroeconomic 
variable.4 The importance of the NER is greater in a small open economy with an 
inflationary past, like many Latin American countries. Its relevance derives from its effects 
on both nominal and real variables. 
Regarding its influence on nominal variables, the NER is a key determinant of the price 
level. In small open economies, traded goods prices are to a great extent determined by 
international prices scaled by the NER (P = E P *). In countries with an inflationary past, 
2 See Tavlas et al. (2008) for a critical survey. 
3 See, for example, the chapter on exchange rate and monetary policies in the Handbook of Development 
Economics (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2009). 
4 We follow the Latin American convention defining the exchange rate as the domestic price of a foreign 
currency (i.e. units of domestic currency per unit of US dollar). A rise in the NER implies a nominal depreciation 
and a fall an appreciation. The same logic applies for the real exchange rate. In this regard, we refer to more 
competitive or undervalued RER to higher values of the RER.  
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the behavior of the NER typically affects inflation expectations and the price-setting 
mechanisms of non-tradable firms and wage-setters. Because of these features, the NER 
plays a key role in determining the inflation rate and can operate as a nominal anchor 
(Dornbusch and Fischer, 1986). It is also a key determinant of other important nominal 
magnitudes. The NER is an asset price, and as such it influences expectations and behavior 
in financial markets. In countries with a history of high inflation, it has been common to set 
nominal contracts in a foreign currency. Many Latin American countries have tended to 
denominate financial assets and real estate prices in US dollars (Savastano 1992). When 
contractual dollarization is widespread, the robustness of financial and payments systems 
become very sensitive to NER variations.  
The NER is also a key determinant of the real exchange rate (RER) in the short and 
medium run. In a world with full employment and fully flexible prices, the RER would be 
an endogenous variable determined in general equilibrium. The classical nominal-
neutrality axiom, however, can hardly be sustained in the exchange rate policy discussion, 
as it has systematically been documented that the RER tracks the NER quite closely over 
the short and medium-run (Taylor and Taylor, 2004). Therefore, the choice of the exchange 
rate regime considerably influences the behavior of the RER via its effect on the NER.5  
The real exchange rate is a fundamental relative price in the economy. It can be defined 
either as the relative price between domestic traded and non-traded goods or as the relative 
price between similar bundles of goods traded abroad and domestically.6 As any relative 
price, the RER affects resource allocation and, given unemployment or underemployment, 
the level of activity. Economists have traditionally emphasized the role of the RER in 
influencing the trade balance through its effect on exports and imports. In the early 
Keynesian tradition, the effect of the RER on net exports was important not only in 
determining the balance of payments, but also in determining output and employment 
levels. Since then, the RER has been seen as a key variable for the determination of 
external and internal equilibrium (Meade, 1951 and Salter 1959). Structuralists, later on, 
pointed also to the effect of the RER on the balance of payments and output and 
employment levels through its effect on income distribution (Ferrer, 1963, Diaz Alejandro, 
1963 and Krugman and Taylor, 1978). More recent contributions, developed after the 
various financial crises in emerging markets during the 1990s and 2000s, highlighted the 
effects of wealth redistributions of variations in the RER on output, employment and the 
property right structure (Krugman 1999, Cespedes et al. 2004, Frankel 2005). Finally, 
research during the early 2000s on Latin American countries has shown that the RER can 
5 Governments can also influence the RER by affecting real variables such as public saving through fiscal policy. 
6 The former is usually referred to as the internal RER and the latter as the external RER. 
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affect employment directly through its effects on the degree of labor intensity embedded in 
production techniques (Frenkel and Ros, 2006 and Galindo et al., 2007). 
Early development economists tended to dismiss the role of the RER in the process of 
economic development as a consequence of elasticity-pessimism (Williamson 2008). Given 
that both the demand for developing countries’ exports (i.e. raw materials) and developing 
countries’ demand for imports (i.e. capital goods) were seen as essentially inelastic, the RER 
was considered irrelevant for trade performance, external balance and economic growth. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, this view gradually lost adherents as countries following outward-
oriented development strategies outperformed those engaged in inward-oriented strategies, 
leading to an incipient recognition of the importance of maintaining a competitive RER in a 
development strategy (Diaz Alejandro, 1973). During the 1980s, this notion gained status in 
the development policy debate. The fact that “achieving a competitive exchange rate” was 
one of the items included in the Washington Consensus Decalogue illustrates this 
sentiment eloquently (Williamson, 1990). However, it was not until recent years that this 
notion achieved a more relevant status in development economics. The rapid economic 
growth experienced by some countries maintaining competitive currencies, especially 
China, has contributed in this regard. Although the exact channel through which it occurs 
is still under dispute, a large body of work documenting that competitive RERs correlate 
with higher growth has provided a solid empirical support for this view.7 This has led to the 
idea that the choice of exchange rate regimes in developing countries is not neutral for 
growth, especially if it is focused on preserving a stable and competitive real exchange rate 
(SCRER) or at least on avoiding overvaluations (Commission on Growth and Development, 
2008). 
In sum, the choice of exchange rate regimes has decisive implications for the behavior of the 
NER. This is a key macroeconomic variable that affects the behavior of relevant nominal 
and real variables, including the inflation rate, the balance of payments, output and 
employment levels and the rate of economic growth. In this regard, the exchange rate 
regime can have a decisive influence on four key economic policy objectives: 
a) Price stability 
b) Domestic financial stability and robustness  
c) External and internal balances  
d) Economic growth/development 
In our view, the choice of exchange rate regimes in Latin America has been influenced to a 
great extent by the historically specific degrees of freedom (or urgency) with which 
7 See, among others, Razin and Collins (1999), Polterovich and Popov (2002), Hausmann et al. (2005), Aguirre 
and Calderon (2005), Prasad et al. (2007), Gala (2008), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2008), Rodrik (2008) and 
Razmi et al. (2009). 
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countries had addressed these policy objectives. In section 4, for instance, we will show that 
in the circumstances in which stabilizing inflation was virtually an emergency, the choice of 
the exchange rate regime was almost exclusively driven by the objective of stabilizing 
prices. This choice could undermine the other policy objectives and potentially lead –as 
happened in many cases- to disruptive results. Along this paper, we will emphasize the 
correspondence between policy objectives and the exchange rate regime choice. 
An exchange rate regime is defined by the rules followed by the central bank regarding the 
degree of intervention in the foreign exchange (FX) market and therefore by the degree of 
official commitment in the determination of the NER.8 A fixed exchange rate regime is 
defined by monetary authority’s commitment to intervene in the FX market in order to 
maintain certain constant parity. The most extreme case of fixed regimes is when a country 
gives up the sovereign right of issuing its own currency and adopts a common currency with 
other nations or one issued by some other country. In Latin America, this regime choice has 
taken the form of the latter, in particular by countries adopting the US dollar. The most 
popular case of dollarization is that of Panama. More recently, Ecuador and El Salvador 
also joined the club of dollarized countries.9  
A currency board is another extreme case of a fixed exchange rate regime, in which 
countries adopt an explicit legislative commitment to fix the NER at certain parity, 
combined with restrictions on the central bank to issue domestic currency almost 
exclusively in exchange for foreign currency. The currency board was an invention of the 
British Empire to provide their colonies a stable and convertible currency (Williamson, 
1995). In Latin America, the only experience during the period under analysis was 
Argentina’s convertibility between 1991 and 2001. This regime was implemented as an 
attempt to provide a credible nominal anchor to stabilize the price level in the context of 
hyperinflation.  
On the other extreme of regime choices, we find the pure floating, which is defined by the 
commitment of the monetary authority not to intervene in the market, leaving the NER to 
be almost exclusively determined by private market forces. Between the poles of pure 
floating and extremely fixed or hard peg choices there is a spectrum of alternative exchange 
8 As with any other classification, those regarding exchange rate arrangements are not exempt from some doses 
of arbitrariness. Different definitions of exchange rate regimes can be easily found in the literature. A widely 
used classification is that reported by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Exchange Rate Restrictions. The IMF’s classification has varied over time (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). Since 
1999, the institution has been using a classification composed by seven types of arrangements. Our definitions 
essentially coincide with this more recent classification scheme.  
9 Since its independence in 1903, Panama’s official currency has been the Balboa, but in practice the US dollar 
has been used widely for most transactions. Ecuador initiated its transition to substitute its national currency 
(Sucre) for US dollars in January 2000. El Salvador abandoned its own currency to adopt the US dollar in 
January 2001 and thus became the third dollarized economy in Latin America. For analyzes of the dollarization 
experiences of Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador see Goldfajn and Olivares (2001), Beckerman and Solimano 
(2002) and Quispe-Agnoli and Whisler (2006), respectively.  
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regimes -the so called intermediate options- that been have widely employed in the post 
World War II period in Latin America and elsewhere. (Williamson, 1981 and Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002). During this period, Latin American countries experimented with an ample 
set of intermediate exchange regimes, depending on the particular domestic and 
international contexts they faced. The most widely used regimes -ordered in increasing 
degree of flexibility- have been: adjustable peg, active and passive crawling peg, bands and 
crawling bands and managed floating.  
Adjustable peg (or fixed but adjustable) was the exchange rate regime promoted during the 
Bretton Woods period. Under this regime, the authorities were committed to defend a 
particular parity, but reserved the right to change it under certain circumstances. Under a 
crawling peg, the authorities pegged the local currency to a foreign currency –or to a basket 
of currencies– but adjusted the rate gradually over time in a series of small corrections, 
instead of sudden and unanticipated discrete changes as with the adjustable peg. When 
implementing an active crawling peg (or tablita) the authorities pre-committed the future 
path of the rate. Because they share essential characteristics with the conventional peg, 
these regimes were used with stabilization purposes (e.g. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in 
the late 1970s). In a passive crawling peg, the gradual adjustment of the peg can be related 
to the evolution of reserves or to the differential between domestic and international 
inflation. The motivation in this case is to maintain purchasing power against a single or 
basket of foreign currencies that are relatively stable around certain level. Central banks in 
Latin America adopted different degrees of commitments to the rules of adjustment of 
passive crawling pegs. In some cases, the authorities followed a systematic rule, for 
instance, indexing the NER to last period (i.e. month) inflation minus an estimate of 
international inflation (e.g. Chile in 1984). In some other cases, the commitment was loose 
or the adjustment path did not follow a systematic rule, but was determined discretionarily 
by the authorities (e.g. Argentina in 1964, Chile in 1965 and Brazil in 1968). In 
Williamson’s (1981) classification, this latter case is denominated a ‘decision-variant’ 
crawling peg, whereas the former ‘formula-variant’. The ‘decision-variant’ type resembles 
and shares characteristics with a managed floating regime. 
Exchange rate bands have also been used in the post war period. In the standard case, the 
authorities typically pledge to intervene when the exchange rate hits pre-announced 
margins on either side of a central parity. However, given the typical inflationary context, 
countries adapted this regime to the form of crawling bands, in which the margins of the 
bands were adjusted gradually over time following some rule to avoid real appreciation due 
to inflation (e.g. Chile and Colombia in the 1990s). Some Latin American countries have 
used an innovative scheme sometimes called asymmetric bands, in which the upper bound 
is adjustable, while the lower one remains constant (e.g. the Real Plan in Brazil during the 
mid-1990s).  
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Managed floating is typically defined as a regime under which the authorities are not 
committed to defend any particular rate, but nevertheless intervene in the FX market at 
their discretion. Recent experience in developing countries has shown that most countries 
saying that they float actually intervene in the FX market to manage the way they float.10 
The motivations behind the interventions vary between countries; they can aim to reduce 
NER volatility, to avoid large swings, or to induce the path of the NER and RER. As 
discussed in section 3, Latin American countries have used this regime during the 2000s 
with different motivations. 
Finally, it has not been uncommon for Latin American countries to face extreme difficulty 
in meeting international payments (i.e. balance of payment crises), where preserving the 
disposable stock FX reserves becomes a priority. In such critical situations, central banks 
have been forced to free the exchange rate, not as an optimal policy choice but as a sheer 
need. Given that the resulting depreciation of the local currency would likely have severe 
economic and social effects –in many cases, leading to hyperinflationary episodes– the 
authorities typically opted to impose restrictions on FX transactions. The imposition of FX 
controls meant, in practice, the implementation of a multiple exchange rates regime. In 
some cases, the monetary authority determined the agents and operations that could be 
carried through the official FX market -which was governed by a particular exchange rate 
regime- and let the rest of the FX transactions be carried in private free markets. The 
official market was typically limited to some “essential” trade and financial transactions. In 
other cases, FX transactions were restricted to authorized institutions and agents that were 
able to undertake only a limited type of transactions. In such contexts, parallel or black 
markets for the non-authorized transactions spontaneously emerged. In these markets, the 
NER floated and was typically higher than in the official market. When the volume of 
transactions in the black market was larger than in the official market, the parallel NER 
was the relevant price affecting private agents’ behavior and expectations. 
 
3. A panoramic view 
 
In each particular period, the exchange rate regime choice in Latin American has been 
designed to orient macroeconomic policy towards the objectives considered most urgent or 
demanding. Changes in the international context were crucial in these choices. 
Macroeconomic policies have typically responded to those changes to either take advantage 
of the opportunities opened by the new conditions or to protect themselves from their 
potential negative impacts. Most of the changes in the external conditions have affected the 
10 As mentioned in the introduction, there is a large body of studies distinguishing between de facto and de jure 
exchange rate regimes. See Tavlas et al (2008) for a survey. 
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countries in the region simultaneously. However, the policy reaction has not been uniform. 
Countries adopted different strategies to cope with new international scenarios. These 
strategies were determined to a great extent by countries’ economic policy agendas; namely, 
the problems perceived as needing immediate attention and the elements of the economic 
performance that were deemed necessary to preserve. Therefore, national policy agendas 
have been determined by the economies’ previous trajectory.  
 
The 1950s and 1960s 
The main characteristics of the international conditions that Latin America faced during 
the post war period remained virtually unchanged up until the late 1960s. The 
international monetary system followed the Bretton Woods rules, which established that 
countries had to maintain fixed exchange rates against the US dollar. These parities could 
be adjusted in the presence of fundamental disequilibrium. Given the virtual absence of 
private sources of international finance, the only substantial source of external finance for 
the region came from the IMF. In order to get financial assistance, countries had to 
negotiate their exchange rate policy with the institution.  
By the end of the period of high commodity prices associated with the Korean War, many 
Latin American countries started to experience balance of payments problems and had to 
rely on exchange rate adjustments agreed on with the IMF.11 This was the beginning of a 
period characterized by stop-and-go dynamics resulting from the inconsistency between the 
adjustable pegs regimes and the high inflation rates experienced by many countries. 
Shortages in FX reserves required adjustment of the fixed exchange rate. Devaluations, in 
turn, transitorily alleviated the balance of payment problems due to the fall in the demand 
for imports caused by the contractionary effect on aggregate demand (Ferrer, 1963 and Diaz 
Alejandro, 1963). However, they also led to the acceleration of the inflation rate due to wage 
indexation and real wage resistance (Bacha and Lopes, 1981). The RER appreciation 
resulting from inflation led again to balance of payment difficulties. This cyclical stop-and-
go dynamic was a stylized fact among many countries in the region since mid 1950s and 
during the 1960s.12  
 In order to deal with the structural feature of high inflation and avoid stop-and-go 
dynamics, by the mid 1960s an innovative solution was found: the passive crawling peg. 
11 Peru was the first Latin American country to sign an agreement with the IMF in 1954. Then Mexico, Chile, 
Paraguay, Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil and Haiti 
signed agreements with the IMF during the 1950s; some of them more than once. 
12 The foreign exchange constraint to economic growth in Latin America and other developing countries found a 
rationalization in the two-gap model literature pioneered by Hollis Chenery. See, for instance, Chenery and 
Strout (1966). An early stylized description of the stop-and-go dynamics applied to Argentina can be found in 
Braun and Joy (1968).  
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Under this regime, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia managed to relax the balance of 
payment constraint and experienced an acceleration of economic growth. Interestingly, the 
crawling peg had been proposed by academic economists as a solution to the problem faced 
by the Bretton Woods system given the different rates of (low) inflation experienced by 
developed countries in the mid 1960s. However, the IMF rejected the proposal, even when 
the system was on the edge of its collapse (Williamson, 1981). In a more pragmatic fashion, 
the crawling peg was simultaneously invented and adopted in Latin American around the 
same period. The adoption of this regime was certainly not universal. Other countries, most 
notably Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, did not experience high levels of inflation and 
maintained fixed regimes up to the 1970s or beyond. 
It has been commonly indicated that Chile in 1965 was the first country to adopt a crawling 
peg.13 In fact, Argentina had implemented such a regime in early 1964 under the 
government of Arturo Illia (Garcia Vazquez, 1994 and De Pablo, 1999). The crawling peg 
was then adopted by Chile in April 1965, Colombia in early 1967 and Brazil in August 
1968, reaching a respectable status among developing countries during and after the 1970s. 
These four countries instrumented ‘decision-variant’ crawling pegs, in which the economic 
authorities adjusted the NER periodically without following precise and transparent rules. 
The frequency of adjustments varied from country to country. In the three years that 
crawling peg lasted in Argentina, the NER was devalued on average once every other 
month. During the first years of its implementation in Colombia, on the other hand, 
authorities adjusted the NER almost every week. In Chile and Brazil, devaluations were 
essentially carried out on a monthly basis. 
In all four countries, the purpose of implementing crawling pegs was to achieve RER 
stability and thus stimulate export growth and diversification. There was a clear 
recognition among economists and policy makers that more dynamic exports were required 
to overcome the FX constraint to growth. RER stability was not, however, the only goal of 
the exchange rate policy in Chile and (especially) Colombia. In these countries, the 
authorities believed that export dynamism not only required RER stability but also 
competitiveness; thus to achieve SCRERs they pursued rates of devaluation that tended to 
outpace past inflation rates. In the four countries, economic performance exhibited a 
significant improvement after the adoption of the crawling pegs. Between 1965 and 1970, 
Chile’s economy grew at 4% per year and non-copper exports expanded substantially. The 
exchange rate policy shifted to a fixed regime in 1970, when the government of Salvador 
Allende initiated its (failed) attempt towards socialism.14 During the first seven-year period 
since the implementation of the crawling peg focused on a SCRER (1967-1974), Colombia 
experienced the period of highest economic growth in its post World War II history: GDP 
13 This is, for instance, the recollection in the pioneer historical analysis by John Williamson (1981), where it is 
noted that “the crawling peg was first adopted by Chile, following the urging of Ffrench-Davis (1964)”. 
14 For further details about the crawling peg in Chile during this period, see Ffrench-Davis (1981) and (2002), 
chapter 1.  
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grew at 6.6% annually and the value of non-traditional exports multiplied by a factor of 
seven.15 The implementation of the crawling peg in Brazil also coincided with the initiation 
of a period of high growth, popularly known as o milagre econômico (economic miracle). 
Between 1968 and 1973, the economy grew at an average rate of about 11% per year and 
exports more than tripled, stimulated by the expansion of non-traditional items.16 
Argentina experienced a period of growth acceleration and export diversification with the 
implementation of the crawling peg. Although the regime was abandoned in mid 1967, the 
authorities managed to keep a SCRER in the subsequent period through a sharp 
devaluation in 1968 followed by a NER fixation. A second round of devaluations began in 
mid 1970, but in this case inflation accelerated and the RER gradually appreciated 
prompting a massive balance of payments crisis in 1975. Overall, between 1964 and 1974, 
GDP grew at a yearly rate of 5%, non-traditional exports passed from representing less 
than 5% of total exports to about 25% and the trade balance remained always positive.17 
A negative aspect associated with these experiences with crawling pegs was the behavior of 
inflation. In Argentina, the NER adjustments maintained RER stability during the three 
years that the crawling peg lasted, but they also contributed to high inflation, around 30% 
per year. In Colombia, the inflation rate gradually moved from figures around 5-10% before 
the implementation of the crawling peg to around 25% by the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 
Brazil the implementation of the crawling peg did not change inflationary dynamics 
substantially; the inflation rate remained around 20% and only accelerated after the first 
oil shock in 1973. Chile was the only case in which inflation was actually reduced. Although 
the path of NER depreciation tended to outpace past inflation, inflationary expectations did 
not accelerate. The inflation rate averaged 26% between 1965 and 1970, which -despite 
being still high- was significantly lower than the one prevailing when the crawling peg was 
implemented (about 50%). 
 
The 1970s 
Between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Latin American countries began to face a 
significantly different international context: the gradual emergence of the second wave of 
financial globalization. Two key events in this process occurred during the first half of the 
15 For a detailed analysis of the role of crawling peg in the Colombian strategy pursuing a SCRER and its effects 
on export diversification and economic growth, see Diaz Alejandro (1976), Ocampo (1994) and Urrutia (1981). 
16 Some authors have questioned the extent to which the milagre can be considered a process of sustained 
growth. It has been argued that the economic expansion was partly due to the use of spare capacity and that the 
high growth rates would have eventually led to an unsustainable current account deficit -even without the 
negative effects of oil shocks- because of the high import-elasticity associated with the structure of the 
manufacturing sector (Bacha, 1977). Regardless of whether the experience actually constitutes a sustained 
growth episode, there seem to be agreement that the stability of the RER achieved through the crawling peg 
had a decisive influence in the observed acceleration of growth (Cardoso, 2009). For a detailed analysis of the 
system of ‘mini-devaluations’ in Brazil during the milagre, see (Bacha, 1979). 
17 For analysis of the period, see Gerchunoff and Llach (2003) chapter 7 and the references therein.  
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1970s. First, there was a shift in developed countries from fixed to floating exchange rates 
which strongly stimulated the development of FX markets and their derivatives (Eatwell 
and Taylor 2000). Second, OPEC countries generated the first coordinated rise in the price 
of oil. The shock rapidly caused large current account imbalances in oil-importing countries 
and at the same time supplied the incipient Eurodollar market with abundant liquidity. 
Since that period there has been steady growth in international capital flows concurrent 
with a progressive de-regulation of capital accounts and a progressive liberalization and 
opening of domestic financial systems. Both trends shaped the second wave of financial 
globalization. Latin America was part of that process from its very beginning. Brazil started 
to tap the Eurodollar market in the late sixties. Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela jumped in as recipients of capital flows in different moments of the 1970s. Since 
then, the financial integration with global markets became a very important factor in the 
performance of Latin American economies and their macroeconomic policies.  
The new global scenario was one of high liquidity and high inflation. International banks 
were striving to place their credits. The international interest rate was low and in some 
periods the real interest rate was even negative. In this context, two polar cases of 
international financial integration and macroeconomic policy formulation can be identified 
in Latin America. One is represented by Brazil, the other by Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. 
As mentioned above, Brazil had been growing at very high rates since 1968, with a level of 
inflation that was high according to current standards, but was moderate and controlled 
according to the prevalent view at that time. The oil shock of 1973 generated a large trade 
deficit. In such a context, the Brazilian authorities decided to continue stimulating growth 
and take advantage of the international financial conditions to finance not only the 
increased value of imports but also an additional program of public and private investment, 
aimed at deepening the process of import substitution of inputs, raw materials and energy. 
The government was the main recipient and intermediary of the international credits, 
which were used for financing both public and private investment. There was no significant 
modification of the exchange rate regime –a passive crawling peg intended to preserve a 
competitive RER– or the monetary policy that had been in practice since the late 1960s. 
Both the current account deficit and the foreign debt followed rising trends. 
During the first half of the 1970s, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay had suffered severe 
economic and political crises that derived in persistently high inflation rates. The military 
coups that took power immediately afterwards tried to take advantage of the international 
financial conditions to induce radical changes in the economic structures and fight inflation 
at the same time. They liberalized the domestic financial systems, reduced taxes on trade, 
tackled with different intensity fiscal imbalances and opened the capital account of the 
balance of payments. In the second half of the 1970s, all three countries oriented their 
exchange rate policies towards stabilizing prices, adopting active crawling peg regimes. The 
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so-called tablitas were schedules of pre-announced rates of devaluation, which were meant 
to function as nominal anchors for inflation. The theoretical support of these policies -the 
recently formulated monetary approach to the balance of payments (Frenkel and Johnson, 
1976) - posited that the size of the current account deficit was irrelevant, since capital 
inflows would automatically and passively compensate for it. The only variable that needed 
to be controlled was the expansion of domestic credit by the central bank. If the source of 
money creation (i.e. fiscal deficits) was under control, the exchange rate policy could be 
oriented to an exclusive inflation target, disregarding its effects on the balance of payments 
and other aspects of economic performance. In all three cases, the private sector was the 
main recipient of external credits. The experiences led to substantial RER appreciation and 
a rapid increase in current account deficits and foreign debts.  
Other countries also opened their capital accounts and borrowed from the international 
capital markets, but did not abandon their traditional pegged exchange rates regimes. This 
was, for instance, the case of Mexico. Due to an excessively expansive fiscal policy during 
the early 1970s, Mexico suffered a severe balance of payment crisis in 1976, forcing the 
authorities to devalue for the first time in more than twenty years. After a year of 
sequential adjustments, the NER was fixed again in early 1977. About that time, the 
discovery of voluminous oil reserves changed economic perspectives about the country. The 
perception that the change in oil prices represented a permanent change encouraged the 
government to initiate an ambitious industrialization program borrowing from the 
international capital markets. The economy expanded at rates of 8%-9% between 1978 and 
1981, inducing an acceleration of the inflation rate, which remained about 20% yearly. 
Given the fixed NER, the RER appreciated and current account deficit soared.18  
The next important change in the external context occurred in late 1979, when the Federal 
Reserve modified the orientation of monetary policy, thus, prompting a rise in international 
interest rates. The further increase in oil price in 1979 should also be mentioned, because it 
had a large negative impact on Brazil’s external accounts. These changes did not triggered 
drastic changes in the macroeconomic policies. However, all the economies that had been 
involved in the process of financial globalization shared one important feature: they 
maintained large current account deficits and accumulated foreign debts. Even Brazil, 
which followed a different path than most of the other recently globalized Latin American 
countries -avoiding appreciation of the RER and maintaining its previous growth strategy- 
suffered the consequences of the shock. The persistent current account deficits and the 
accumulation of foreign debt had left its economy vulnerable to changes in the external 
financial conditions as well.  
 
18 The oil shock also had a similar impact on Venezuela’s economic performance. Public expenditure soared, the 
RER appreciated substantially, and foreign debt accumulated. For details, see Rodriguez (1985). 
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The 1980s 
The rise in international interest rates and virtually nil access to foreign finance in the 
early 1980s triggered massive balance of payments (and in some cases financial) crises in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The immediate reaction of 
national authorities to this new external scenario was to reorient macroeconomic policies to 
cope with the effects of the debt crisis. All countries relied on significant devaluations and 
oriented their monetary and fiscal policies towards the management of the fiscal and 
external disequilibria and their repercussions. Colombia was an exception. Since it had had 
a more cautioned approach to external borrowing during the booming period (i.e. it only 
contracted foreign debt during 1979-1982 and on smaller doses), the change in the external 
financial conditions had not such a perverse impact on its economy. In fact, Colombia was 
the only major Latin American country that managed to surf the early 1980s with positive 
GDP growth rates.  
Between 1982 and 1990, the interaction of Latin American countries with international 
financial markets was limited to a series of negotiations of the external debt inherited from 
the crisis. During this period, foreign credit was rationed and subject to negotiations with 
the creditors banks and the IMF. The countries had to make substantial payments to honor 
at least part of their external obligations. However, not all major countries in the region 
performed the same during the period. Two main elements help explain the differences in 
their performances: first, the gap between the external financial needs and the financial aid 
provided by the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank and Inter American 
Development Bank), and second, the inflationary processes that followed the devaluations 
of the early 1980s. Both factors were substantially more favorable for Chile and Colombia 
compared to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.  
In the case of Colombia, the needs of external finance were relatively manageable. Chile, on 
the contrary, was the country with the highest debt/GDP ratio in the region and its needs 
for external credit were bulky. However, it managed to receive the largest proportion of the 
disposable resources for the region from the international institutions and also to engineer 
a favorable debt restructuring (Ffrench-Davis, 2002 chap. 4). On the other hand, in both 
Chile and Colombia the inflation rate –although accelerated after the crises- never 
surpassed 35% a year. For these reasons, both countries managed to balanced their 
external accounts and avoid sharp devaluations after the first round of external 
adjustment. In the context of a manageable inflation rate, both countries used exchange 
rate regimes oriented towards preserving a stable RER. Colombia continued with the 
passive crawling peg regime that had been launched in the late 1960s and sustained a 
modest economic performance. Chile put into practice an innovative crawling bands regime 
in 1984 targeting a SCRER aimed at generating a significant trade surplus to compensate 
for the lack of external finance. Given that the initial fluctuation bands were too small, the 
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system initially resembled a standard passive crawling peg. Later, in the second half of the 
1980s, the fluctuation bands were gradually increased and then substantially sharpened in 
the early 1990s. The implementation of the crawling peg and crawling bands arrangement 
coincides with the beginning of the period of the highest and most sustained growth in 
Chile’s history. Section 5 analyzes this experience in greater detail as the paradigmatic 
Latin American example of exchange rate regime targeting the RER in the post debt crisis 
period. 
The size of the external gap and the acceleration of inflation following the crises intensely 
affected the economic performance of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. For these countries, the 
1980s were a lost decade. In Mexico the inflation rate passed from being around 30% 
annually to above 100% after the crisis. Between 1984 and 1986, it remained oscillating 
around annual figures of 60-70% and then accelerated again in late 1986, reaching rates 
above three digits up until mid 1988, when a successful stabilization program managed to 
bring down inflation. In Argentina and Brazil, inflation rates never fell below three digits, 
except immediately after launching the heterodox stabilization plans in the mid 1980s, 
when inflation rates transitorily descended to 2-digit figures. None of these three countries 
managed to close the external financial gap and reach a restructuring agreement with their 
creditors. In order to induce external adjustments, they continually relied on sharp 
devaluations. All three countries attempted to stabilize prices with programs that targeted 
external and financial equilibria. These programs also included some sort of agreement 
with the international financial institutions and the foreign creditors. However, external 
credit rationing made it increasingly difficult to maintain external and fiscal equilibria, 
forcing the authorities to devaluate. Devaluations, in turn, accelerated the inflation rate.  
By the mid 1980s, the inflationary process tended to accelerate in both Argentina and 
Brazil. In order to stop these developments, Argentina in 1985 and Brazil in 1986 launched 
the so-called heterodox stabilization programs.19 These were shock-therapy plans in which 
the fixation of the NER was used as the main nominal anchor. One special characteristic of 
these programs was that the authorities substantially devalued the domestic currencies 
before the fixation. The Southern Cone programs have taught that stabilization plans are 
typically followed by real appreciation due to inertial inflation after the fixation. The ex-
ante devaluation was meant to compensate for such an expected appreciation, but also 
because the authorities wanted to reach an ex-post competitive RER. Given the lack of 
foreign credit, external balance could only be achieved by substantial trade surpluses, for 
which a competitive RER would be crucial. The initial conditions of the programs also 
required external and fiscal equilibria compatible with the fixed exchange rate. To that end, 
19 Almost simultaneously, Israel implemented a stabilization program that shared many similarities with those 
in Argentina and Brazil. The Israeli plan was successful at stopping inflation and also contributed to the 
recovery of the economy. For details, see Fischer (1987) and Bruno (1988). 
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agreement with the external creditors and the international financial institutions aiming to 
soften the credit constraint was also essential. The heterodox component of the plans was 
the use of incomes polices (price and wage controls) to coordinate the dynamics of the labor 
and goods markets with the fixed exchange rate and to stop the widespread use of 
indexation mechanisms. Another innovative element of these programs was the monetary 
reforms that included the introduction of new currencies (the Austral in Argentina and the 
Cruzado in Brazil). The plans were initially successful in both reducing inflation 
significantly and in fostering economic recovery. However, the difficulties involved in 
preserving the external and fiscal balance led to new devaluations and fiscal adjustments 
that derived in the acceleration of inflation and recessions.20 
After reaching an inflation rate of 165% in 1987, Mexico launched a stabilization program 
in 1988, which shared some similarities with those previously implemented in Argentina 
and Brazil. The Pacto de Solidaridad Económica (Economic Solidary Pact) was a plan that 
combined fiscal adjustment, fixation of the NER and incomes policies. The program was 
successful in bringing inflation down. One year after, it was reformulated. The exchange 
rate regime was replaced by a crawling peg following a small rate of devaluation. In 
November 1991, the crawling peg was substituted with a band within which the NER was 
allowed to fluctuate. The ceiling of the band was increased by small daily adjustments, 
while the floor remained constant. Since the stabilization program was launched, the RER 
tended to appreciate and the economy started to register increasing current account 
deficits. However, contrary to the experience of Argentina and Brazil with the heterodox 
plans, Mexico was not forced to give up the exchange rate regime and devalue its currency 
to achieve external balance. The change in the international financial conditions during the 
late 1980s helped the country maintain the macroeconomic policies. The highly liquid 
environment, low international interest rates and especially the restructuring of its 
external debt in 1989 under the Brady Plan made Mexico a very attractive destination for 
international investors. Thus, Mexico began the 1990s with a macroeconomic configuration 
characterized by an (asymmetric) crawling band within which the NER remained virtually 
fixed, rapid liberalization of trade and finance, RER appreciation and both increasing 
current account deficits and increasing capital inflows. This configuration persisted until 
1994, when the fear of foreign investors concerning the sustainability of the (virtually) fixed 
exchange rate triggered a reversal of capital flows and a balance of payments crisis.21  
 
 
20 Analyses of the characteristics of the Argentine Austral Plan can be found in Frenkel (1987) and Heymann 
(1987). For details of the Brazilian Cruzado Plan, see Bacha (1987). 
21 See Dornbusch and Werner (1994) and Ros (2001). 
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The 1990s 
The change in the international financial conditions beginning around 1989 represented 
another turning point for macroeconomic policies in Latin America. As in the second half of 
the 1970s, this new period was also characterized by high liquidity and low interest rates in 
international financial markets. In such a context, in 1989 the US government launched 
the Brady plan, which aimed to help highly indebted countries relieve their debt burden 
with international banks. Debt was converted into bonds –called Par and Discount– 
collateralized with US Treasury bills. After Mexico, Costa Rica (1989), Venezuela (1990), 
Uruguay (1991), Argentina (1992), and Brazil (1992) signed debt restructuring agreements 
within this framework. The increased deregulation of domestic financial systems in 
developed economies also contributed to this process by widening the group of institutions 
demanding assets from these new emerging market countries. Overall, these changes in the 
international context “pushed” capital from developed countries into the developing world 
(Calvo et al., 1993). For Latin American countries, this new international context meant the 
end of the external credit rationing they had faced during the 1980s. Mexico, Argentina 
Brazil and Chile became the main recipients of foreign capital, but Colombia, Peru and 
other countries also received significant volumes. Capital inflows to Latin America peaked 
in 1993, fell in 1995 as a consequence of the Mexican crisis and grew again until the 
eruption of the Asian crises in 1997-1998. 
Once again, national macroeconomic policies adapted to the new international context 
according to the previous evolution of the economies and national policy agendas. Two polar 
strategies can also be identified for this period. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which had 
unsuccessfully fought high inflation and remained stagnant during the 1980s, welcomed 
the novel international financial context because it made viable to carry stabilization 
programs using the NER as nominal anchors without facing the external credit constraint 
that prevailed in the previous decade.  
As mentioned above, Mexico launched the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica based on an 
almost fixed exchange rate. Argentina did so even more aggressively, launching the so-
called “convertibility” regime in early 1991, which was characterized by the fixation of the 
domestic currency against the US dollar (AR$/$ 1) and the establishment of a currency 
board system by law. The convertibility was implemented concurrently with liberalizing 
measures including an almost complete liberalization of trade flows and full deregulation of 
the capital account of the balance of payments. There was also an impressive process of 
market-friendly reforms, targeting the privatization of a large proportion of state-owned 
enterprises. The stabilization program also involved price negotiations between the 
government and several productive sectors, aimed at reinforcing the effect of the exchange 
rate peg as a nominal anchor on inflation. The program was very successful at curbing high 
inflation. However, as occurred in Mexico, stabilization came together with RER 
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appreciation, large current account deficits and growing external debt, which finally ended 
up in a dramatic currency and financial crisis in 2001-2002. Section 4 analyses the case of 
the Argentine convertibility regime in detail.  
The case of Brazil is similar. The country had received significant capital inflows during the 
early 1990s, but at that time the authorities found them problematic as they hindered the 
conduction of monetary and the exchange rate policies based on a passive crawling peg 
regime. The new international context became functional to macroeconomic policy only in 
1994, when the Real Plan was launched. The stabilization program was implemented in 
three steps.22 First, a comprehensive adjustment of fiscal accounts, implying substantial 
cuts in the federal budget, was implemented. The second stage included a monetary reform, 
in which a new unit of account (the Unit of Real Value, URV) pegged to the US dollar was 
introduced. The goal of this second stage was to facilitate the gradual re-denomination of 
existing contracts -with overlapping indexing mechanisms- in the new URV. Since the 
value of the URV was fixed in terms of US dollars, the conversion of the contractual system 
into UVR helped eradicate indexation mechanisms from the economy.23 Finally, in July 
1994, once the process of re-denomination of the contractual system into the new unit of 
account was concluded, the central bank started to issue the URV. The URV, latter re-
named as Real, began to operate as the new currency. Under the new exchange rate regime, 
the monetary authority was committed to selling FX reserves once the price of the Real 
reached one US dollar, but was not obliged to intervene when it was below that parity. As 
in the cases of Mexico and Argentina, the purpose of this semi-fixed regime (also called the 
asymmetric band) was to provide an anchor for inflation. The effects of the Real Plan on the 
RER, the external accounts and debt accumulation were similar to those observed in Mexico 
and Argentina, and the process finally led to an exchange rate crisis in early 1999. 
The other polar strategy during the 1990s was that followed by Chile and Colombia. Unlike 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, these countries had been growing since the mid 1980s 
(especially Chile), while maintaining relatively manageable inflation rates. Chile and 
Colombia also adapted their macroeconomic policies to the new international financial 
conditions, but always while trying to maintain a cautious orientation regarding capital 
inflows and their effects on the real economy. Their macroeconomic policies aimed to 
preserve the configuration of relative prices and external trade, which were at the core of 
their ongoing growth strategies. Capital inflows, particularly short term flows, were 
considered potentially damaging, because they could induce RER appreciation and have 
destabilizing effects on monetary policy. Given that inflation was not as severe a problem as 
in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, these countries oriented their macroeconomic policy so as 
22 For a detailed analysis of the political and economic conditions in which the Plan Real was implemented as 
well as its results, see Bacha (2002). 
23 The intellectual roots of the monetary reform are due to a paper by Persio Arida and Andres Lara-Resende 
(1985), popularized by Rudiger Dornbusch (1985) as the “Larida proposal”.  
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to preserve a relatively competitive RER, while providing at the same time enough 
monetary autonomy to achieve a gradual deceleration in the inflation rate. To that end, 
macroeconomic policy was configured around two key elements. First, a crawling band 
regime, which was meant to maintain a SCRER in the medium run while generating NER 
volatility in the short-run. Second, since the degree of NER volatility was not enough to 
guarantee monetary policy autonomy, both countries also adopted regulations on the 
capital account. This gave monetary policy enough room to target a gradual decrease in 
inflation rates. Thus, without using the NER as a nominal anchor, both Chile and Colombia 
achieved a gradual deceleration of inflation during the first half of the 1990s and 
maintained relatively high rates of economic growth (especially Chile).24  
Peru represents a singular and interesting case in this narrative. During the 1980s, the 
country followed a similar path to those of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, including the 
implementation and failure of a heterodox stabilization program and the acceleration of 
inflation, which ended in a hyperinflationary episode in 1989-90. Thus, like the other three 
countries, Peru began the decade with high inflation and a stagnant economy. However, as 
occurred in Chile and Colombia, the macroeconomic policy followed during the early 1990s 
managed to reduce inflation significantly without fixing the NER. In 1990, the central bank 
of Peru stopped targeting the NER and adopted a system of monetary targets and managed 
floating. The restrictive monetary policy between 1990 and 1992 led to a substantial RER 
overvaluation (i.e. the rate of NER depreciation was significantly below the rate of 
inflation), which helped decelerate the inflation rate (Dancourt, 1999). Up until 2002, when 
the country adopted an inflation targeting regime with “pure” floating, the central bank 
maintained this policy relying on interventions in the FX market as the main mechanism to 
control the quantity of money and manage the NER. The strategy proved to be successful to 
reduce the inflation rate without generating recessionary trends. Between 1994 and 2002, 
the economy expanded at about 4% annually and the inflation rate fell from about 40% to 
less than 3%.  
The rise of international interest rates in early 1994 was an important factor causing the 
Mexican currency crisis. Speculation against the peso during that year finally forced the 
authorities to let it float in December 1994. The economy contracted by 6.2% in 1995 and 
many domestic banks went bankrupt. The tequila effect spread to Argentina, which also 
suffered a sudden stop of capital inflows. Granted a voluminous financial assistance 
package led by the IMF, the Argentine authorities managed to preserve the convertibility 
regime in 1995. That did not prevent, however, the recessive impact of capital outflows on 
the activity level (-2.8%) or the severe financial crisis that led many domestic banks to 
24 Analyses of the Colombian experience with the crawling-bands-cum-capital-controls strategy can be found in 
Ocampo and Tovar (2003), Villar and Rincon (2000) and Williamson (1996). The case of Chile is discussed in 
greater detail in section 5. 
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bankruptcy. The Asian and Russian crises in 1997-1998 affected Brazil, whose external 
account was showing signs of vulnerability. In 1998, the current account deficit had reached 
4.5% of GDP and the RER a level 30% lower than the average of the 1980s. In January 
1999, after several months of resisting a persistent speculation against its FX reserves, the 
Brazilian central bank decided to let the Real float. The financial contagion of the Asian 
and Russian crises and the currency crisis in Brazil triggered a prolonged depression in 
Argentina beginning in the second half of 1998 and ending in a financial and external crisis 
in 2001-2002. The consequent economic collapse resulted in a 21% contraction in GDP with 
respect to the peak of mid 1998 and up to a 21.5% rise in the unemployment rate, leaving 
half the population below the poverty line. The government also declared a massive default 
on its external debt. In Section 4, we analyze the Argentine experience under the 
convertibility regime as the paradigmatic example of the three major Latin American 
countries that during the 1990s oriented their exchange rate policies to stabilize prices.  
As opposed to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru did not suffer 
external crises during the 1990s. Certainly, the RER in both Chile and Colombia followed 
appreciating trends between the mid-1990 and the unfolding of the Asian crises in 1997-
1998. These trends were, in fact, facilitated by the monetary authorities of these countries, 
who decided to drive the bands downwards in the mid 1990s. These decisions were 
supported by their understanding that a real appreciation was justified in terms of 
economic fundamentals. The fact that the Mexican crisis had not significantly affected 
capital inflows to these economies, combined with a widespread belief during that time that 
capital flows to emerging markets were a permanent (and stable) phenomenon, 
strengthened monetary authorities’ conviction that RER appreciations were required. 
However, the resulting appreciation experienced by these countries was moderate and 
short-lived compared to those in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. This difference helps to 
explain their relatively more robust external conditions and their greater degree of freedom 
to control the exchange rate when the crises hit their economies. Nonetheless, the Asian 
and Russian crises had a negative impact on Chile, Colombia and Peru. The greater 
flexibility of the exchange rate regimes in Colombia and Peru did not prevent the negative 
domestic financial effects of NER depreciation and capital outflows, and both Colombia and 
Peru suffered financial crises in 1999.  
 
The 2000s 
The Mexican crisis of 1994, but more markedly the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998 
induced important changes in the views of policy makers and economists concerning the 
choice of exchange rate regimes in developing countries. A number of authors began to 
argue that in a world of high capital mobility, intermediate regimes were highly prone to 
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currency crises. Thus, a notion gradually started to emerge suggesting that developing 
countries should either have a pure floating exchange rate or a hard peg regime –such as a 
currency board or full official dollarization. The IMF was especially emphatic about the 
benefits of the polar regimes suggested by this view (Fischer, 2001). The prevalent opinion 
actually favored pure floating regimes as a better institutional setting to deal with the 
admitted volatility of capital flows. However, since Argentina’s convertibility –and other 
hard pegs in a few small countries like Hong Kong- had survived these crises, the prevalent 
view reserved a status for hard pegs as a corner solution for a few special cases. 
Most Latin American countries opted for “pure” floating and inflation targeting (FIT) for 
their exchange rate and monetary regimes. After the crisis, Mexico let the peso float while 
using a monetary policy of monetary aggregates to control inflation. In 1999, the country 
switched to an inflation targeting monetary regime, with a monetary instrument to 
determine the interest rate that later evolved into the formal utilization of an overnight 
interest rate. Also in 1999, Brazil, Colombia and Chile joined the club of Latin American 
FIT countries. Brazil did so as a result of the currency crisis it suffered at the beginning of 
that year. Both Chile and Colombia had already been utilizing annual targets of inflation 
since 1990 and 1991 respectively. Although they were not labeled as inflation targeters at 
that time, these countries can be considered pioneers in the implementation of such a 
regime in the region. Peru had been using managed floating jointly with a monetary regime 
based on quantitative monetary targets since the early 1990s. In 2002, the central bank 
formally adopted a “pure” floating and an inflation targeting regime. Initially, the 
authorities kept monetary aggregates as main policy instrument, but in 2003 they switched 
to overnight interest rate, coupled with sterilized interventions.  
Despite their public statements about their exchange rate regime choice, none of the Latin 
American FIT countries have let their currency float the way assumed under a conventional 
FIT arrangement (Chang, 2008). Central banks in Latin American FIT countries have not 
had a passive role in the determination of the NER and therefore their exchange rate 
regimes are better classified as managed floating. Evidence shows that central banks in 
these countries have set their reference interest rate in reaction to NER movements. A 
priori, this is not inconsistent with a pure FIT regime. Given that the NER is an important 
transmission mechanism for monetary policy and that its level and changes have important 
effects on inflation and aggregate demand, FIT central banks can use the interest rate (i.e. 
policy instrument) to influence inflation through its effects on the NER (Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002). However, the behavior of the central banks in Latin American FIT 
countries has gone beyond influencing the NER via interest movements. Intervention in the 
FX market has been common practice. Moreover, as documented by Chang (2008), central 
banks in the Latin American FIT countries have explicitly claimed a right to intervene in 
the FX market. Even the central bank of Chile -which announces the scope and timing of its 
22 
 
                                                
interventions to make them transparent for the public-, can hardly be considered a pure 
floater.  
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, intervention in the FX market appeared to be 
motivated by the attempt to avoid substantial NER depreciations. Some analysts have 
interpreted their behavior as a case of “fear of floating”. According to Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002), there are two main reasons why countries may fear to float. First, nominal 
depreciations are likely to accelerate inflation. In this regard, FX interventions appear to be 
a policy instrument that complements overnight interest rates in curbing inflation, as 
explained above. For instance, De Gregorio et al. (2005) explain that the Central Bank of 
Chile decided to intervene in the FX market to contain the depreciation pressures during 
2001 and 2002 generated by the 9/11 attack, the convertibility collapse in Argentina and 
turbulence in Brazil due to the presidential elections. According to the authors, the 
authorities believed that in these episodes the NER overreacted and that a monetary 
tightening would have unnecessarily deepened the cycle. Chang (2008) cites memorandums 
from the central bank of Brazil invoking similar arguments for their FX interventions 
during the turmoil before the presidential elections in 2002. Second, sudden upward 
movements in the NER can have undesired balance sheet effects in dollarized economies. 
With this motivation, interventions are meant to target financial stability as a policy 
objective in its own right. Peru, the country with the most dollarized financial system 
among the Latin American floaters, is probably the best example –if any- of this case.25 As 
some analysts have observed, given the high degree of financial dollarization, the Peruvian 
version of the FIT policy has had an explicit focus on ameliorating NER fluctuations that 
can affect the normal behavior of the financial system (Dancourt, 2009). Moreover, the 
central bank has purposely accumulated FX reserves so that it can serve as lender of last 
resort in dollars in case of a bank run (Dancourt, 1999 and Armas and Grippa, 2006).  
Between 2004 and 2008, international financial markets increased their appetite for risk 
leading to an unprecedented surge in capital flows to developing countries. The policy 
reaction in many of these countries was to actively intervene in the FX market; but 
contrary to what is expected under the fear of floating hypothesis, central banks purchased 
FX. Two main explanations have been offered to understand this behavior. One suggests 
that countries accumulate reserves to reduce NER volatility and to prevent large swings of 
the NER due to international capital volatility (Aizenman and Lee, 2007). The other 
indicates that it is the consequence of a development strategy based on an exchange rate 
policy aimed at preserving an undervalued RER or SCRER (Dooley et al, 2007). This latter 
strategy has sometimes been labeled as neo-mercantilism. 
25 In December 1999, 82% of credit in Peru’s financial system was denominated in dollars. Since then there was 
an explicit policy to de-dollarize the economy. By December 2008, the level fell to 52%. Other dollarized 
countries, like Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay, have also taken explicit measures to reduce financial 
dollarization in their economies during the 2000s. 
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During this period, central banks in Latin American FIT countries accumulated a 
substantial volume of FX reserves. The process of reserve accumulation, however, was not 
homogenous across countries. Between 2004 and 2008, Brazil quadrupled its stock of FX 
reserves, Peru more than tripled it and Colombia doubled it. Mexico, although increasing 
the stock of FX reserves during this period (+50%), had a less systematic strategy. The 
Central Bank of Chile had a more passive role the FX market: it only began to accumulate 
reserves persistently in mid 2007, increasing its stock of foreign exchange reserves by 50% 
between that period and Lehman Brothers’ collapse. However, the accumulation of FX by 
the fiscal stabilization funds during the copper price boom since 2004 helped substantially 
to avoid a massive exchange rate appreciation without requiring the intervention of the 
central bank. Many analysts, including the authors of this paper, interpret this recent 
trend as an effort to prevent excessive appreciations of the RER.26 It is important to notice, 
however, that the latter does not mean that these countries followed a SCRER or neo-
mercantilist strategy: preventing excessive RER appreciations markedly differs from 
pursuing a stable and competitive RER. In the last section of this paper, we make the claim 
that preventing excessive real appreciations can be understood as part of a broad 
precautionary motive. In our view, the recent trends of exchange rate policies in Latin 
American FIT countries are better interpreted as an example of this general motive, rather 
than the result of pursuing a SCRER or neo-mercantilist strategy.  
There are several reasons making it inappropriate to include the Latin American FIT 
countries within the neo-mercantilist group. First, as documented by Chang (2008), all 
central banks from these countries have made explicit statements that they do not pursue 
exchange rate targets. They claim that under their regimes exchange rates are determined 
by fundamentals and interventions are only meant to avoid excessive deviations from 
fundamental levels. Certainly, claims may contradict actual actions. However, they seem to 
be backed by the actual behavior of their RERs. In none of these countries, the behavior of 
the RER resembles that observed in other countries where authorities explicitly asserted 
that they were following SCRER strategies, as in Chile with the crawling bands (1985-
1995) or in Argentina with the managed floating after the convertibility crisis (2003-2008), 
which is commented on below.  
First, the RERs in the FIT countries have tended to be substantially more volatile. Table 1 
reports the coefficient of variation (standard deviation over mean) of the RER as an 
indicator of volatility.27 With the exception of Mexico and Peru, the RER has been 
substantially more volatile in the FIT countries than in the countries experimenting with a 
SCRER (Argentina 2003-08 and Chile 1985-95). The RER has been particularly volatile 
26 See Chang (2008) for the cases of Brazil, Colombia and Peru, Agosin (2009) for Chile and Dancourt (2009) for 
Peru.  
27 The reported RER are the bilateral RER against the US, deflated by CPI indexes. The periods utilized for 
each experience exclude the year in which each regime was implemented. 
under the Brazilian FIT: the RER has been 259% and 209% more volatile than under the 
managed floating in Argentina and the crawling bands in Chile, respectively. It is also 
interesting to notice that the switch from the crawling bands to the FIT has resulted in 
more volatility in the RER of Chile (+65%).  
 
Table 1: RER volatility 
Coefficient of 
Variation
Variation (%) 
against Arg 
(2003-08)
Variation (%) 
against Chile 
(1985-95)
Argentina (2003-08) 0.068 0% -
Chile (1985-95) 0.079 - 0%
Brazil (2000-08) 0.244 259% 209%
Chile (2000-08) 0.130 91% 65%
Colombia (2000-08) 0.153 125% 94%
Mexico (2000-2008) 0.050 -26% -37%
Peru (2003-08) 0.066 -3% -16%  
 
Mexico and Peru preserved stable RER, but at substantially appreciated levels. Mexico 
followed a persistent real appreciation trend since late 1996, which ended in early 2002 
with a RER even more appreciated (about 8% lower) than the year before the tequila crisis 
(1994).28 Between early 2002 and the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the RER 
remained slightly more depreciated than during the pre-tequila crisis, but more appreciated 
than the 1980-2001 average. In Peru, the RER was maintained relatively competitive 
during the 2002-2007 compared to the average prevailing during the 1990s. However, it 
remained substantially appreciated if the comparison is made with the average during the 
1980s.  
In the other Latin American FIT countries, significant appreciation trends were also 
observed. When the inflation targets were threatened, central banks did not hesitate to 
induce NER appreciation to meet them. This was clearly observed in the wake of rising 
inflation fuelled by the surge in food and energy prices beginning in 2004. All central banks 
raised interest rates and allowed the NER to appreciate with the aim of limiting the pass-
through from imported inflation. In Brazil, the RER depreciated between its currency crisis 
in early 1999 and late 2002 due to a succession of adverse shocks, including the Argentine 
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28 Graphs 1 to 6 in the appendix show the bilateral RER with the US (deflated by CPI indexes) between 1980 
and 2008 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Each series has a base equal to 1 for the 
average RER between 1980 and 2008.  
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2001-2002 crisis, its domestic energy crisis in 2001 and capital flight due to the political 
uncertainty around the election of President Lula Da Silva in 2002. Beginning in late 2002, 
the RER followed a systematic appreciation trend, which has been substantially 
exacerbated since 2004. This trend lasted until Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. At that 
moment, the RER had reached a minimum about 8% lower than the pre-1999 crisis and 
about 30% lower than the 1980-2008 average. The trajectory of the RER in Colombia was 
similar to that in Brazil. After a period of sustained depreciation resulting from similar 
adverse shocks, the RER followed a persistent appreciation trend. By mid 2008, its level 
reached the lowest level in 24 years, 27% lower than the 1980-2008 average. The post-2002 
appreciation in Chile was softer, although it also accelerated since 2004. By mid 2008 the 
RER reached a level about 18% lower than the average of the 1980-2008 period. 
Several authors have emphasized the greater volatility and the appreciation bias that have 
characterized the behavior of the RER in the Latin American FIT countries. Galindo and 
Ros (2008) show that the FIT arrangement in Mexico has had an appreciation bias. Using 
VAR econometrics, they find that this has resulted from an asymmetric monetary policy, 
which has been tightened when the NER depreciates, but not loosened when it appreciates. 
Similarly, Barbosa-Filho (2008) claims that the Brazilian central bank has also followed an 
asymmetric monetary policy, which has been the responsible for the RER appreciation. He 
observes that between 2000 and 2006, inflation targets were met only in the years in which 
the RER experienced substantial appreciation. Agosin (2009) estimates a Markov-switching 
model for the behavior of the RER in Chile. He finds that the shift from the crawling bands 
to the FIT arrangement coincides with a regime switch in the model. Similar to the 
evidence in Table 1, Agosin also finds that the volatility of the RER corresponding to the 
first regime (crawling bands) is substantially lower to the one in the second regime (FIT).  
In its search for greater flexibility, Argentina followed a somewhat different path than that 
of the FIT countries. After the 2001-2002 crisis the authorities tried to recreate a 
macroeconomic regime similar to that in Chile during the crawling bands period. However, 
instead of adopting such a regime, the central bank followed a pragmatic managed floating 
arrangement, which implicitly aimed to combine a certain degree of short-run NER 
volatility with the preservation of a SCRER in the medium run. The exchange rate policy 
has also had an explicit goal of FX reserve accumulation meant to protect against volatility 
in international financial flows. The SCRER combined with fiscal discipline (to which the 
public debt restructuring in 2005 contributed substantially) provided the economy a sound 
macroeconomic configuration. It was the first time in its modern history that Argentina 
maintained external and fiscal surpluses for such a long period (2002-2008). This 
macroeconomic configuration was undoubtedly a key factor in explaining the sharp 
acceleration of growth. Since the second half of 2002, the economy grew steadily at annual 
rates of 8-9%, maintaining a relatively dynamic export performance. By 2006-07 the 
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economy started to show signs of accelerating inflation and by 2008 due to political conflicts 
and the effects of the international financial crisis, the pace of economic growth decelerated 
significantly. Section 5 analyzes the Argentine experience with a managed floating regime 
targeting a SCRER.  
 
4. The exchange rate as a nominal anchor 
 
The tablitas in the Southern Cone  
The so-called Southern Cone stabilization plans refer to the exchange-rate-based programs 
implemented in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in late 1970s, in which pre-announced 
schedules of devaluations (tablitas) played a key role as nominal anchors. At the time these 
programs were implemented, the three countries were fighting against high inflation rates 
which had settled down since the hyperinflationary episodes that followed the collapse of 
the “populist” attempts in the early 1970s.29 In all three countries, military coups took 
power in the mid 1970s and first tried to stabilize with policies based on shifting from 
multiple to single exchange rates, fiscal restraint (especially in Chile and Uruguay) and 
reducing the rate of monetary expansion. Inflation, however, remained die-hard. This led to 
a second phase, starting in 1978, in which authorities in the three countries appealed to the 
exchange rate policy as a nominal anchor. 
The tablitas were active crawling pegs, where the central banks pre-announced the future 
values of the nominal exchange rate over a specified horizon. In all three cases, the 
schedule described an upward trajectory of the exchange rate, starting with an initial rate 
of devaluation lower than the ongoing inflation rate and followed by successively decreasing 
rates. The decelerating rate of devaluation would eventually converge to zero at which time 
the exchange rate would remain fixed. Chile was the only country where the fixation 
actually occurred (in mid-1979); in both Argentina and Uruguay, the schemes were 
abandoned before reaching that point.  
The tablitas were applied in the context of broad economic liberalization programs. All 
three countries followed, with differing intensities, the liberalization of both the current 
and the capital accounts of the balance of payments, the deregulation of previously-
repressed domestic financial markets and, especially in the case of Chile, the privatization 
of state-owned firms. There was also an explicit attempt to balance the fiscal accounts, 
29 Populism is a label widely used in Latin American political discourse to characterize governments that 
legitimate their policies by appealing to the opposition between “the people” they supposedly represent and “the 
elites”. It has also been used in economics to characterize certain unsuccessful attempts to change income 
distribution, without paying sufficient attention to macroeconomic consistency. See, for instance, Canitrot 
(1975) and Dornbusch and Edwards (1989). 
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which was especially successful in Chile and Uruguay.30 The objective of these reforms was 
not to stabilize prices; they were thought (like their successors of the Washington 
Consensus) as measures to achieve greater economic efficiency and growth. However, they 
were also meant to play some complementary role in stabilizing prices. 
The pre-announcement of the exchange rate path was the key element of the stabilization 
strategies. The tablitas were inspired by the Monetary Approach to the Balance of 
Payments (MABP) developed in the 1970s at the University of Chicago (Frenkel and 
Johnson, 1976). In a context of (fairly) open trade, a decelerating rate of devaluation has a 
direct effect on reducing inflation of traded good prices. This was not, however, the key 
channel through which the exchange rate policy was expected to affect domestic prices. The 
effect of the pre-announcement would be to lower inflationary expectations. Disclosure of 
future values of the exchange rate was an attempt to affect expectations of forward-looking 
contracts and thus provide a nominal anchor for future prices. According to the MABP, a 
reduction in expected inflation would raise the demand for money, facilitating the 
absorption of the money supply and, thus, lowering the inflation rate. To succeed, however, 
the announcement should be credible so to induce expectations in the right direction. Under 
the MABP, in which the balance of payments is thought to adjust to money market 
disequilibrium, achieving the desired expected rate of inflation requires consistency 
between the rate of variation of the exchange rate and the creation of domestic credit by the 
central bank (Calvo and Fernandez, 1982). In particular, a deceleration in the rate of 
variation of the exchange rate requires a reduction in the creation of domestic credit. Since 
central banks can create domestic credit by financially assisting the treasury or commercial 
banks, a view inspired by the MABP would predict that a pre-announced schedule of 
decreasing devaluations would be successful in reducing inflationary expectations if it is 
accompanied by a reduction in the monetization of the fiscal deficit. The credibility of the 
announcement relies on fiscal austerity (Blejer, 1983).  
The implementation of the tablitas did not yield the expected results.31 Inflation 
decelerated after the programs were launched although at a much slower pace than that 
involved in the devaluation schedules. Inertial inflation remained high due to the effects of 
backward-looking contracts, including wage indexation, but also due to the indexation of 
30 The order in which reforms were made differed from country to country. An important difference regarded the 
sequence of current and capital account liberalization. Argentina and Uruguay first opened financially and then 
later reduced tariffs, whereas Chile conducted a deeper trade liberalization program first and opened to capital 
transactions in a later stage. The different strategies triggered a voluminous literature on the optimal sequence 
of liberalization. The predominant view, partly inspired by the initial success of Chile’s reforms, suggested that 
countries should first attempt to remove distortions in domestic goods and capital markets and achieve a 
balanced fiscal budget, then liberalize international trade, and only later open the capital account (McKinnon, 
1982). For a critical assessment of the sequencing literature, see Fanelli, Frenkel and Taylor (1992). 
31 For a detailed description of the stylized facts of the stabilization program in Argentina see Canitrot (1981), 
Frenkel (1983a) and Fernandez (1985); for the Chilean case, see Ffrench-Davis (1983) and Corbo (1985) and for 
the Uruguayan case, see Hanson and de Melo (1985). 
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many non-tradables such as housing rents, school fees and mortgage payments. The slower 
speed of deceleration of non-tradable prices compared to that of tradables (which more 
closely followed the schedules of devaluations) led to appreciation of the RER. On the other 
hand, the deceleration of expected exchange rate devaluation initially led to a fall in 
nominal domestic interest rates, as the uncovered interest parity theorem would suggest. 
However, due to inflationary inertia and exchange rate risk, the interest rate did not fall 
sufficiently to equilibrate the yields between similar domestic and foreign assets. The 
interest rate differential triggered a substantial capital inflow to all three countries. The 
impact of greater liquidity combined with RER appreciation facilitated the expansion of 
economic activity. The resulting deficit in the current account was more than offset by 
capital inflows, allowing for FX reserves accumulation by the Central B
In all three countries, this initial expansionary phase was followed by a gradual increase in 
domestic interest rates and a deceleration of capital inflows. The higher cost of capital 
combined with the substantial RER appreciation was a negative combination for the 
profitability of tradable firms, whose activity and employment levels contracted 
substantially, especially in Argentina and Chile. In a context of stagnant economic activity 
and substantial current account imbalance, the expectation that the exchange rate rule 
would be abandoned increased. This resulted in a further reduction of capital inflows and 
liquidity and higher interest rates due to higher risk premia. This situation finally led to 
financial distress in the banking system. In all three countries, banking crises arose around 
one year before the abandonment of the exchange rate rule.32  
Most analyses of the Southern Cone experiments agree that the collapses arose from the 
perverse macroeconomic configuration consisting of high real interest rates and overvalued 
RER. A transitory rise in the real interest rate together with an appreciated RER, however, 
is not inconsistent with the expected results of the programs. Based on a framework ala 
Dornbusch (1976) with perfect capital mobility and sluggish adjustment in the goods 
markets, Rodriguez (1982) develops a model showing that a successful stabilization 
program based on a tablita would make the real interest rate fall first and then rise, 
together with an initial appreciation and then depreciation of the RER. A stylized fact of 
these experiences, however, is that the nominal interest rate began to rise after an initial 
decreasing phase. According to the MABP paradigm on which Rodriguez’s framework is 
based, the nominal interest should have followed a decreasing path until equating with the 
international interest rate.33 This behavior, simultaneous with the deceleration of the rate 
32 In Argentina the banking crisis started in the second quarter 1980 and the exchange rate regime was 
abandoned in March 1981; in Chile, they occurred in the second half of 1981 and in June 1982 respectively. In 
Uruguay there was a problematic financial situation from 1981 and the exchange regime was abandoned in 
November 1982. Obviously, in these three cases the devaluation worsened the financial problems. 
33 This prediction results from assuming that the uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds permanently. The UIP 
suggests that the domestic nominal interest rate (i) has to be equal to foreign nominal interest rate (i*) plus the 
expected rate of variation of the NER (e): i = i*+ e. If the path of preannounced decreasing rates of devaluation 
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of devaluation, is indicative of an increasing risk premium. Theoretical efforts were made to 
explain the behavior of the risk premium as an endogenous result of the stabilization 
program. One popular explanation, also based on the MABP, pointed to a potential 
inconsistency between the programmed exchange rate devaluations and the creation of 
domestic credit via public deficit monetization. This explanation found support in the 
Argentine experience, where authorities have little success at reducing fiscal deficit (Calvo 
and Fernandez, 1982). It is hard to reconcile, however, with the Chilean and Uruguayan 
cases, where fiscal balance was achieved before launching of the tablitas. The failure of 
inflation to converge international levels, the appreciation of the RER and the rising risk 
premium must be explained by other factors. 
More plausible stories focus on the destabilizing effects of capital account convertibility in 
the context of poorly developed domestic financial systems (Diaz Alejandro, 1985), and the 
effect of current account imbalances on worsening expectations that the exchange rate rule 
will be maintained. Frenkel (1983b), for instance, develops a portfolio balance model 
showing that risk premium increases as an endogenous result of an enlargement of current 
account imbalances. The model is aimed at illuminating a context similar to those observed 
in the implementation of the tablitas, where financial agents try to take advantage of the 
significant spreads between the yields of foreign and imperfect substitute domestic assets 
arising from credible fixed or predetermined exchange rates and capital account 
convertibility. The behavioral story behind the model is as follows. Given the spreads, few 
local players take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities initially, issuing foreign debt to 
do so. Their exposure to risk essentially depends on the probability that the exchange rate 
rule is altered (i.e. the exchange rate risk). From the viewpoint of the individual investor, 
engaging in external borrowing to exploit an arbitrage opportunity has no significant effect 
on the sustainability of the exchange rate rule. However, since the first movers are 
exploiting significant benefits, other players have strong incentives to jump in, even when 
by doing so their combined actions may have negative macroeconomic consequences.  
The macroeconomic consequence of financial arbitrage is where all action happens. Capital 
inflows expand liquidity and credit in the economy. As a result, domestic interest rates and 
spreads fall, and output and employment grow. The expansion of aggregate demand leads 
to increases in non-tradable prices, which under fixed or predetermined exchange rate 
regimes generate a RER appreciation. The real appreciation can be reinforced by the effect 
of inertial inflation arising from backward-looking contracts, as in the case of the tablitas. 
The combined effect of the RER appreciation and economic growth worsens the current 
account. This gradually weakens the credibility of the exchange rate rule. As the 
probability of exchange rate devaluation increases, the risk premium and the domestic 
 
contained in the tablita is credible, the domestic nominal interest rate reduces systematically down to the level 
of the foreign interest rate exactly when the exchange rate is finally fixed (e = 0).  
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nominal interest rate also increase. The balance sheet of the domestic financial system -
which is short on foreign currency and long in local assets - becomes increasingly fragile to 
potential NER changes. Capital inflows are retained by the increase in the domestic 
interest rate; however, there eventually comes a point at which no interest rate can attract 
new external financing. Capital outflows force the central bank to abandon the exchange 
rate rule. The final outcome is a sequential or simultaneous twin (external and financial) 
crisis. 
These dynamics fit the stylized facts of all three Southern Cone failed stabilization 
attempts. Furthermore, this analysis can be extended to explain the external and financial 
crises in Latin America during the 1990s (Taylor, 1998 and Frenkel, 2004). These are the 
cases of stabilization programs based on fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates commented on 
in the previous section: the Mexican “Economic Solidary Pact” program that ended in the 
1994 crisis, Brazil’s Real Plan of 1994 that led to the currency crisis of 1999, and 
Argentina’s convertibility regime implemented in early 1991 that collapsed in 2001. In 
these experiences, the economies followed a boom-and-bust cycle led by the behavior of 
capital movements. All of them started with the implementation of liberalization and 
exchange-rate-based stabilization programs that gave rise to a profitable environment for 
financial arbitrage between domestic and foreign assets. The Southern Cone tablitas were 
not unique, but simply the first experiments of this type.  
 
Argentina’s currency board, 1991-2001 
High inflation became a major concern for Argentine policy makers since 1970. The so 
called high inflation regime was a complex set of institutions, rules and practices that 
developed as an adaptation to the long-lasting inflationary environment (Frenkel 1990). 
This regime collapsed with two hyperinflationary episodes in 1989 and 1990. The second 
episode was temporarily controlled by the implementation of a set of stringent fiscal and 
monetary measures. In a context of high uncertainty, the central bank contributed to 
stabilizing expectations by following a managed floating policy aimed at keeping the 
nominal exchange rate relatively stable. In the meantime, the inflation rate remained very 
high, around 11% per month. The resulting RER appreciation led in early 1991 to a new 
round of runs against the peso and a rise in the exchange rate. Fearing that rapid NER 
depreciation could lead the economy into a third hyperinflationary episode, the government 
fixed the exchange rate.  
Under the authorities’ view, however, a simple fixation would not be enough to stabilize. 
Given Argentina’s long history of failed stabilization attempts, the prevalent view was that 
the stabilization program should be made as credible as possible. In order to reinforce its 
31 
 
                                                
credibility, in March 1991 the congress established a fixed parity between the domestic 
currency and the U.S. dollar by law (the so-called convertibility law), and the full baking of 
the monetary base with FX reserves. The convertibility law transformed the central bank 
into a currency board: any issuing of domestic currency by the central bank should be 
backed by an equivalent purchase of U.S dollars.34 To further influence private sector 
expectations, a few months later the government replaced the denomination of the local 
currency (Austral), making one unit of the new currency (Peso) equivalent to one U.S. 
dollar (AR$/$ 1). It was also allowed to set contracts either in pesos or in foreign currencies. 
As mentioned above, the currency board was implemented concurrently with liberalizing 
measures including, from early 1991, an almost complete liberalization of trade flows and 
full deregulation of the capital account of the balance of payments. There was also an 
impressive process of market-friendly reforms, targeting the privatization of a large 
proportion of state-owned enterprises. The stabilization program also involved price 
negotiations between the government and several productive sectors, aimed at reinforcing 
the effect of the exchange rate peg as a nominal anchor on inflation. 
The program was very successful at curbing high inflation. After having reached four-digit 
annual inflation rates during the hyperinflation period, the rate of increase of domestic 
prices fell swiftly and steadily after the first quarter of 1991. The program had an 
immediate stabilizing effect on the prices of tradable goods, which rapidly converged to 
international inflation. The deceleration of non-tradable price inflation was not as fast. CPI 
inflation rate, a proxy of non-tradable price inflation, dropped substantially, but remained 
considerably higher than foreign inflation until the end of 1994, when it finally converged 
to international levels.35 
There are three aspects about the convertibility regime that are worth mentioning. First, 
given the legal constraints on the central bank’s ability to autonomously manage the 
monetary base, the business cycle was almost fully dependent on the balance of payment 
result. The accumulation (contraction) of FX reserves by the central bank would lead to an 
endogenous expansion (contraction) of the monetary base and bank’s credit, which fostered 
(depressed) domestic demand and output. Thus, balance of payments imbalances tend to 
adjust through output and employment changes rather than via prices.  
Second, despite the high credibility enjoyed for a long time, the convertibility did not affect 
the private sector’s preference for dollar-denominated assets. Bank deposits in pesos 
systematically offered a higher interest rate than that of dollar denominated deposits, 
despite the persistent increase of the proportion of dollar-denominated bank deposits. 
34 In 1992, the currency board was marginally relaxed, leaving the central bank some room, although very 
narrow, to finance the federal government and banks, and to carry out other financial operations. 
35 See Damill, Frenkel and Maurizio (2002) for details. 
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Banks, for their part, hedged their balance sheets against exchange rate risk by offering 
dollar denominated credits, no matter whether debtors’ main source of income was in pesos 
or dollars. The proportion of both assets and liabilities in the local banking system grew to 
more than 60% in the last years of the regime.  
The last aspect worth mentioning relates to the level of the RER. The above-mentioned 
asymmetric speed of convergence between tradable and non-tradable inflation rates 
following the stabilization program implied a real appreciation of the peso. This was not 
unforeseen: as described in previous sections, RER appreciation has been a typical result of 
exchange-rate-based stabilization programs in Latin America. By late 1994, the 
multilateral (or effective) RER and the bilateral RER with the U.S. were 59% and 53% 
lower than the average of 1980-1989, respectively. This significant appreciation did not, 
however, result from the asymmetric response of tradable and non-tradable prices to the 
stabilization program. About three quarters of the appreciation occurred during 1990, when 
the central bank followed a managed floating policy targeting a stable NER in a context of 
high inflation rates. In other words, the RER was substantially appreciated when the 
convertibility was launched. The authorities were not unaware of the potential problems 
resulting from the uncompetitive RER they were validating when fixed the exchange rate. 
Their priority at that moment, however, was to avoid a third hyperinflationary episode with 
potentially catastrophic economic, political and social consequences.36 The competitiveness 
problem was accentuated by the succession of devaluations in developing countries since 
1997, particularly that of Brazil in 1999.  
Under the convertibility regime, Argentina experienced two periods of sustained capital 
inflows that spurred growth. The first occurred between the launching of the stabilization 
program and the contagion of the Mexican crisis in 1995. The second was shorter; it began 
shortly after the “tequila effect” and stopped in mid 1998, after the Asian and Russian 
crises. Since then, the economy remained locked in a contractionary spiral that led to the 
dramatic collapse of the convertibility regime in 2001-2002. This involved abandonment of 
the currency board, devaluation of the peso, a crisis in the banking system and default of 
the external public debt.  
Many interpretations have been elaborated about the convertibility collapse. A common 
explanation is that expansive fiscal policy starting in the late nineties was inconsistent 
with a currency board (Mussa, 2002). In this line of reasoning, Argentina’s experience 
during the convertibility regime showed that a currency board alone does not impose 
36 In late 1992, once inflation had been stabilized, the Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo suggested that the 
RER was appreciated. This led to a massive run against the FX reserves of the Central Bank. The event made 
clear that a NER adjustment would undermine the credibility of the exchange rate rule, thus threatening price 
stability. The authorities aimed to correct the loss of competitiveness instead by means of supply side policies, 
including the privatization-cum deregulation program in energy, telecommunications, ports and transportation, 
flexibilization of the labor market and a reduction in taxes. See Cavallo and Cottani (1997). 
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responsibility on government spending. The emphasis on fiscal irresponsibility as the main 
cause of the convertibility crisis is at a minimum controversial. An analysis of the fiscal 
figures reveals that the authorities followed a contractive policy since 1999 and that the 
increase in public expenditure was mainly due to increasing debt services (Damill, Frenkel 
and Juvenal, 2002).  
Others have pointed to the perverse combination of RER appreciation and financial 
dollarization in triggering and determining the dimension of the crisis (Perry and Serven, 
2003). It seems uncontroversial that the RER was significantly misaligned by the end of the 
convertibility regime and that its correction imposed a substantial negative balance sheet 
effect on those who had a negative net asset position in foreign currencies. Thus, no 
explanation of the convertibility collapse can overlook the relevance of these factors. It is 
important to note, however, that a priori neither of them was a necessary ingredient of the 
currency board regime. They arose from specific local circumstances. A relevant question is 
whether the implementation of the currency board played any role in influencing their 
development.  
A stylized fact of exchange-rate-based stabilization programs is that they are typically 
followed by RER appreciations (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992). But, as mentioned above, in the 
case of Argentine convertibility, the RER was already significantly appreciated at the time 
of fixation. Given that the improvement in labor productivity and supply-side measures 
were insufficient to correct the lack of competitiveness in the tradable sector, a significant 
deflation of domestic non-tradable goods prices would have been required to correct the 
RER misalignment. It is well documented in economics, however, that prices are downward 
inflexible.37 And even if they were not, the also well known debt-deflation effect (Fischer, 
1933) may have undermined this adjustment mechanism. In this regard, Argentina’s 
experience under convertibility highlights the importance of avoiding an appreciated RER 
when implementing an exchange-rate based stabilization program, as subsequent 
adjustments may prove to be problematic. But it also makes clear the trade-off that policy 
makers face when implementing these programs. Granted that the RER will appreciate 
after the plan is implemented, they would like to depreciate the NER before fixing it, as 
attempted in the heterodox programs in Argentina and Brazil in the mid 1980s. However, 
given that the pass-through of NER movements to domestic prices is high in high inflation 
environments (Choudhri and Hakura, 2006), a substantial depreciation of the NER before 
fixing may fail to stabilize prices and might even lead to an acceleration of inflation. This 
trade-off suggests that policy makers should carefully consider not only how to implement 
37 In the case of Argentina during the convertibility regime, Damill, Frenkel and Maurizio (2002) argue that 
labor market legislation played, at most, a minor role in the downward inflexibility of wages and show that 
wages of low-skilled workers were quite flexible according to international standards.  
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an exchange-rate based stabilization program, but also what potential exit options they 
have if they need to abandon it. 
A second issue regards the influence of the currency board (if any) on the increase of 
financial dollarization during the period. In theory, regimes that minimize the volatility of 
the NER should tend to favor the demand of assets denominated in domestic currency. The 
greater the commitment to exchange rate stability, the greater should be the use of the 
domestic currency as store of value. The dollarization of Argentina’s banking system during 
the 1990s is at odds with this prediction. Some have argued that the stability provided by 
the currency board was perceived as an implicit guarantee and led the private sector to 
misperceive the exchange rate risk in their balance sheets (Galiani et al 2003). With 
hindsight, we know that the government should have induced the private sector to contract 
in domestic currency, especially for those operating in the non-tradable sector.  
But, even if the dollarization of the financial system had been limited, the balance of 
payment crisis probably would not have been avoided. As mentioned in the previous 
subsection, Argentina under the convertibility regime can be interpreted as a case of 
perverse dynamics following a stabilization plan based on exchange rate anchoring and 
balance of payment liberalization. The typical RER appreciation deriving from such a 
macroeconomic configuration tends to stimulate domestic demand for tradable goods 
beyond domestic supply. If there is no early correction of the RER misalignment, a 
persistent current account deficit may lead to an unsustainable accumulation of external 
debt. Since in developing countries, external debt is denominated in foreign currency 
(Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999), the required RER depreciation could make foreign-
indebted domestic agents (in either the private or public sector) bankrupt.  
 
5. Exchange rate regimes targeting the RER  
 
Crawling bands in Chile, 1984-1999 
The collapse of the tablita experiment pushed the Chilean economy into a deep depression. 
In 1982-83, output fell almost 18% compared with the peak in 1981, the unemployment rate 
approached 20% of the labor force (and surpassed 30% if excluding the people under 
emergency employment programs), and more than 50% of the population went under the 
poverty line. Simultaneously, there was a massive default on private external debt and the 
domestic financial system had to be bailed out by the public sector at a cost of around 26% 
of GDP. During those years, the (erratic) exchange rate policy aimed to lessen the FX 
shortage, thus allowing a significant depreciation of the local currency through a series of 
35 
 
                                                
discrete nominal devaluations. Tight controls on FX transactions were also reintroduced 
during these years. 
By late 1983, economic activity had stopped falling and financial variables had stabilized. 
In such a context, General Augusto Pinochet’s administration announced the 
implementation of a crawling peg, in which the NER would be adjusted on a monthly basis 
according to the previous month’s inflation minus an estimate of external inflation (around 
2% annually). At the moment of the announcement (December 1983), the RER was about 
60% higher than that prevailing at the moment of the tablita collapse. The implementation 
of this PPP-rule at a substantially more competitive level was not arbitrary. The RER 
appreciation during the stabilization program and its consequences had had a negative 
impact on the perception of both authorities and economists, who deemed the avoidance of 
RER misalignments as a priority for exchange rate policy (Corbo et al., 1986). Besides, the 
lack of foreign credit resulting from the default on external debt and the negative terms of 
trade forced the economy to make a significant current account adjustment. Achieving and 
maintaining a more competitive RER was seen as a natural policy response to facilitate 
such an adjustment.38  
In August 1984, a fluctuation band of ±0.5% was introduced. The NER was allowed to float 
freely within the band defined around the “central parity”, which was in turn determined 
by the PPP-rule. The bands would be subsequently increased in several increments.39 From 
this moment until September 1999, when the central bank decided to let the peso float, 
Chile followed this exchange rate regime based on PPP-adjusting moving bands that has 
been labeled “crawling bands” (Williamson, 1996).  
Pursuing a competitive RER via a PPP-rule (and occasionally through significant discrete 
nominal devaluations) entailed a risk of accelerating the inflation rate. But, the drastic 
scarcity of FX under which the economy was operating left the authorities with no choice: 
they had to prioritize external competitiveness over price stability (Vergara, 1994). The 
potential trade-off between the two objectives, however, was not necessarily binding. Given 
the high level of unemployment and capital underutilization, the inflationary pressures on 
non-tradable goods and services were mild.40 Thus, with the objective of reducing the 
external deficit and given that the economy was operating far below full employment, 
between 1984 and 1989 the government managed the NER to target a SCRER. In this 
38 A simple calculation of the external adjustment results from comparing the current account balance between 
1981 and 1988. The former is the year in which GDP reached the pre-crisis peak, and the latter in which GDP 
returned to the 1981 level. According to such a calculation, the adjustment was 17.4% of GDP, from a deficit of 
18.5% to one of 1.1%.  
39 The band was widened to ±2% in June 1985, to ±3% in June 1988, to ±5% in June 1989 and ±10% in January 
1992.  
40 Williamson (1996) also highlights the “ruthless nature” of the Pinochet dictatorship in keeping wage inflation 
in check as a relevant factor.  
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period, the RER was on average 75% higher than in 1982, while the inflation rate 
fluctuated around a similar or even lower level than the one prevailing before the 
implementation of the crawling bands.41 During this 6-year period, the economy underwent 
a rapid recuperation (6.3% annually), exports grew steadily (about 7% annually) and the 
current account deficit was substantially reduced.  
In late 1989, Chile celebrated its first democratic election in years. In the months previous 
to the election, the NER jumped to the top of the bands. Uncertainty regarding whether the 
new democratic government would maintain the policy orientation as well as the rising 
current account deficit generated expectations of a NER depreciation in the FX market. 
This translated into an excess demand for foreign currency and a rise in the NER. In 1990, 
once President Patricio Aylwin took office and confirmed the continuity of the exchange rate 
regime, a sudden change in market sentiment was observed. A surge of capital inflows led 
to a steady excess supply of FX, forcing the central bank to intervene in the opposite 
direction in order to sustain the NER on the lower bound of the bands.  
The inflow of capital was neither a transitory nor a country-specific phenomenon. As 
mentioned in section 3, motivated essentially by external factors (e.g. low interest in the 
US), in the early 1990s, international capital flowed into many Latin American countries, 
which became attractive emerging markets for foreign investors. The massive and 
persistent inflows of capital that Chile experienced during this period posed a policy 
dilemma for the authorities. In late 1989, the Pinochet administration had declared the 
independence of central bank and established an explicit mandate for price stability as its 
main policy objective. To pursue this objective, the central bank began to follow a 
contractive policy, raising short-term interest rates. In parallel, a moderately contractive 
fiscal impulse was also implemented. By late 1990, the inflation rate began a soft 
deceleration trend. The contractionary monetary policy, however, attracted flows of foreign 
capital. In order to keep the NER within the bands, the central bank had to intervene 
systematically in the market, absorbing the excess supply of FX. The resulting monetary 
emission was partially sterilized.  
The situation that the central bank was facing at the beginning of the 1990s is an example 
of the well-known policy trilemma of a small open economy. Once Chile started to attract 
capital inflows, the conduction of monetary and exchange rate policies targeting both the 
RER (via the NER) and interest rate faced complexities. The fact that the inflation rate was 
still high by international standards (around 20%), implied that the monetary authority 
had to set domestic nominal interest rates high enough to achieve real interest rates that 
would induce a deceleration of inflation. Therefore the level of domestic nominal interest 
41 During 1989, the inflation rate accelerated substantially. Many analysts suggest that this was mainly a result 
of the expansive policies that the Pinochet administration pursued with electoral motivations. See Williamson 
(1996) and Ffrench-Davis (2002). 
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rates was substantially higher than those in the international markets even after adjusting 
for the expected depreciation of the NER. This (adjusted) interest rate differential implied a 
quasi-fiscal cost for the central bank, when implementing sterilized interventions in the FX 
market. At this juncture, the authorities faced essentially three options: 1) let the peso float 
and therefore appreciate both the nominal and the real exchange rate, 2) assume the quasi-
fiscal cost of the sterilized interventions or 3) limit capital mobility. The initial solution was 
a compromise between the three.  
First, in mid-1991, Chile introduced a non-remunerative reserve requirement (encaje) of 
20% in the central bank for a year to loans from foreigners and later on to some equity 
transactions. The encaje was meant to reduce the return that a foreign lender would obtain 
by lending in Chile at the international interest rate. It was expected that short-term 
speculative flows would be discouraged and thus the appreciation trends would be softened.  
Second, in January 1992, after one and a half years of maintaining the NER on the lower 
bound of the bands with this strategy, the central bank ceded to market pressure and 
reevaluated the “central parity”. To increase the degrees of freedom of monetary policy, it 
was also decided to widen the bands from ±5% to ±10%. The authorities had resisted the 
appreciation pressures because they feared that capital inflows would be transitory. 
However, the persistent inflow of capital ended up convincing them that Chile was facing a 
permanent supply of foreign saving, substantially higher than during the post-crisis period. 
The change in the diagnosis also changed the focus of exchange rate policy. From that 
moment onwards, instead of pursuing a competitive RER, the exchange rate policy was 
oriented towards maintaining an “equilibrium” RER, defined as that RER compatible with 
a medium-run current account deficit of 3-4% of GDP. This figure was thought to be a 
“reasonable” amount of foreign saving for a developing country in the process of catching 
up, while keeping the ratio of foreign debt constant (Zahler, 1998). 
Finally, in July 1992, after increasing the encaje to 30%, the authorities switched the peg 
against the US dollar to a basket containing the three principal world currencies: US dollar 
(45%), deutsche mark (30%) and Japanese yen (25%). The main intention was to introduce 
short-term noise in the US dollar-peso exchange rate and thus discourage speculative 
capital movements. It was also during this year that the central bank started to intervene 
in the FX market not only when the NER was close to the bands, but also to manage its 
floatation within the band. 
In the period 1991-94, the appreciation pressures continued. The NER moved 
systematically below the central parity and on some occasions very close to the floor of the 
bands. Nevertheless, the exchange rate policy, helped by the encaje, was successful in 
keeping the RER relatively stable, allowing only for a soft appreciation. The focus of 
exchange rate policy on a real target did not undermine the job of monetary policy to reduce 
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inflation. During this period, the inflation rate went down from 22% to 11%. At the same 
time, the still competitive RER stimulated economic activity while keeping the external 
accounts in check. GDP and exports grew at average rates of 6.8% and 8.5% respectively 
and current account deficit averaged 1.9% of GDP. Social indicators also improved: real 
wages increased by 20%, the poverty rate fell significantly from 38% to 27% and 
unemployment rate from 8.2% to 7.8%. 
The persistence of capital inflows well above the targeted current account deficit seem to 
have persuaded the authorities that the RER needed to appreciate. In November 1994, the 
central parity was appreciated by 10%. Contrary to Argentina and other emerging market 
economies, the Mexican crisis of January 1994 had no significant effect on Chile. Foreign 
capital continued to flow systematically and the view favoring a real appreciation was 
reinforced. Although the crawling band regime was not abandoned, exchange rate policy 
was reoriented in order to help monetary policy reduce inflation. With that goal, between 
late 1995 and the contagion of the Asian crises in late 1997, the NER was kept virtually 
constant within the bands.  
The effect of the crises did not change central bank’s priority for price stability. In the more 
volatile scenario, the authorities reduced the bands significantly (2% for the upper limit 
and 3.5% for the lower bound) and intervened in the FX market in order to smooth the NER 
depreciation generated by the reversion of capital flows. Instead of taking advantage of the 
situation to introduce a readjustment of the RER, intervention aimed at avoiding an 
acceleration of the inflation rate above the official target. The reduction of the bands, 
however, undermined the credibility of the crawling bands and when the Russian crisis 
unfolded, the peso suffered an intense speculative attack. The authorities increased the 
bands to a symmetric ±7% and announced a gradual broadening of the bands, which would 
reach 16% in 1999. To maintain the NER within the bands -and therefore contain the 
acceleration of inflation- the central bank raised the interest rate from 8.5% to 14%. The 
emphasis on price stability over RER targeting was finally institutionalized in September 
1999, when the central bank formally switched to a “pure” floating regime and eliminated 
the encaje. 
 
Managed floating in Argentina, 2002-2008 
The story of Argentina after the collapse of the currency board in 2001-02 in many ways 
resembles the Chilean experience with the crawling bands. Both episodes were preceded by 
severe financial and balance of payments crises, the default of external debts, a pronounced 
contraction in economic activity and a dramatic worsening of social conditions. In both 
cases, the recuperation of economic activity was associated with pragmatic macroeconomic 
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policies that tried to attend to the external and fiscal imbalances, while providing 
incentives for tradable activities. In both cases, the exchange rate policy was oriented 
towards maintaining a SCRER.  
Argentina formally abandoned the currency board (AR$/$ 1) in January 2002 in the midst 
of a severe political and economic crisis. The authorities initially aimed to control capital 
outflows and stabilize the foreign exchange (FX) market by introducing a dual exchange 
rate regime, but the strategy was rapidly abandoned in favor of a floating system. In a 
context of high political and economic uncertainty, where the central bank was running out 
FX reserves, the NER skyrocketed, reaching a peak close to AR$/$ 4 in July 2002. Given the 
distrust in banks (due to the banking crisis) and in the Treasury (due to the default), the 
economic depression and the accelerating inflation generated by the NER depreciation, the 
U.S. dollar appeared to be the only secure asset to allocate savings.  
The stabilization of the FX market started in July, 2002. The central bank introduced 
controls on FX -including the obligation to surrender export proceeds greater than $1 
million- and pursued more active intervention, selling US dollars in the market. Both the 
NER and RER began a downward trend. Despite this appreciation, the RER remained at 
very competitive levels. In July 2003, when the government started to intervene actively in 
the FX market in the opposite direction -now to contain the appreciation pressure- the 
multilateral (or effective) RER was 93% higher than during the convertibility regime (1991-
2001) and 23% higher than the average during the period from 1980 to 2001. The decision 
to contain the appreciation pressure was motivated by the official diagnosis that awarded 
the SCRER a key role in both the recuperation of output and employment and in the 
improvement of the external and fiscal balances.42 Since then, the government gradually 
started to make more explicit reference to the importance of preserving a SCRER in the 
official economic strategy. 
The central bank, however, never made an explicit statement regarding the existence of a 
RER target. According to their official statements and documents, the permanent 
intervention in the FX market was oriented towards accumulation of international reserves 
for precautionary purposes; namely, to protect the economy from international capital 
market volatility (Redrado et al 2006). Statements aside, the joint intervention of the 
central bank and the Treasury in the FX market actually controlled the price of the dollar 
in a range between AR$ 2.8 and AR$ 3.1 up until the beginning of 2007. The nominal 
fluctuation within this interval made the multilateral (or effective) RER remain stable 
around a level almost 100% higher than the average of the convertibility regime. The 
42 The positive effect of the competitive RER on the fiscal accounts derived from the taxes revenues on 
traditional (agricultural) exports introduced in the beginning of 2002, which accounted for about 2.3% of GDP, a 
magnitude almost equivalent to 55% of the federal primary surplus. See Damill et al (2009). 
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bilateral real exchange with the US dollar also remained relatively stable at competitive 
levels, although it began a soft appreciation trend in early 2005.  
The management of the SCRER strategy during this period was not exempt of challenges. 
In 2002, when the Congress passed a law revoking the currency board, the government 
decided to maintain the central bank’s independence with a primary mandate of pursuing 
low inflation. Given that the economy was still absorbing the effects of the crisis and 
domestic financial markets had shrunk significantly, central bank authorities considered 
that the monetary transmission mechanisms of the interest rate were uncertain and weak. 
Instead of following an inflation targeting scheme as the other Latin American FIT 
countries, they opted to follow a more pragmatic policy based on broad quantitative 
monetary targets. From 2003 on, targets were announced at the beginning of every year 
through the central bank’s monetary programs, where authorities committed themselves to 
maintain monetary aggregates within a certain range. Under this regime, monetary targets 
were meant to operate, at least in theory, as a nominal anchor. 
A stylized fact during this period was that the upper bounds of the monetary targets ended 
up being systematically lower than the monetary expansion that resulted from the central 
bank’s interventions in the FX market to attain a SCRER. Since the size of the monetary 
base created by the buying interventions in the FX market tended to exceed the 
programmed expansion of the monetary base, an ‘excess’ of monetary expansion had to be 
absorbed. To achieve this goal, the central bank relied on sterilization operations via the 
issuing of notes (LEBACs).43 Given that during most of this period the FX market operated 
with an excess supply of dollars, the monetary authority managed to reconcile the two 
policy objectives with two instruments. With interventions in the FX market, the central 
bank controlled the NER as a mean to achieve the SCRER target. With the sterilization 
operations in the money market, it maintained monetary aggregates within the 
preannounced ranges, aiming to provide a nominal anchor for the private sector’s 
inflationary expectations.44 
43 Other significant, although relatively minor, sources of monetary contraction were: 1) the repayment from 
2003 to 2006 by commercial banks of the debt accumulated with central bank for its financial assistance during 
the crisis, 2) the Treasury’s purchases of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves to serve the debt with the 
multilateral financial institutions and 3) the use of fiscal and quasi-fiscal surplus by the Treasury and other 
official agencies to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. See Frenkel and Rapetti (2008) for details. 
44 Inspired by Chile’s experience with the encaje, the Argentine government introduced capital controls in June 
2005. The normative required that all capital inflows –excluding the issuing of new private and public debt, 
international trade financing and foreign direct investment- were subject to a 30% unremunerated reserve 
requirement for at least a year. The introduction of the controls, however, showed no evidence of ameliorating 
the supply of dollars in the FX market. The implementation left open ways to avoid the reserve requirements; 
for instance, through the stock exchange market by buying domestic assets abroad and selling them 
domestically. Analysts and market practitioners believed that controls were ineffective and even the authorities 
did not reject the idea that they were introduced more as a signal of the official willingness to maintain the 
SCRER strategy than as an effective control mechanism. 
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It is usually argued that sterilized interventions are useful only for short periods. They are 
seen as transitory instruments because the costs of sterilization tend to increase over time 
and therefore to generate quasi-fiscal imbalances. As discussed in the previous subsection, 
Chile’s experience with crawling bands during the 1990s is an example of this potential 
problem. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that sterilized interventions lead 
invariably to an unsustainable quasi-fiscal balance. In the Argentine experience during this 
period, where (contrary to the Chilean case) domestic interest rates were relatively low, this 
policy was maintained without eroding the central bank’s net worth, which actually tended 
to register quasi-fiscal surpluses.45  
Following the SCRER strategy, Argentina experienced one of the most successful growth 
episodes in its economic history.46 From mid-2002 to mid-2008, the economy grew at an 
8.5% average annual rate. The favorable external conditions -especially the high 
international prices of the agricultural commodities that the country exports- were 
important, but explained only part of the economic performance. It was the expansion of the 
whole tradable sector (exportable and import substitutive activities) that pulled the 
economy up and put it on a rapid growth path. Volatile economic growth in Argentina has 
traditionally been associated with external deficits. During the post-convertibility period, 
on the contrary, the economy expanded while maintaining a stable current account surplus. 
Analysts tend to agree that the dynamic behavior of output, employment and investment 
has been associated with the positive effects of the SCRER on tradable activities. 
One negative aspect of economic performance during this period was inflation, which 
started to accelerate in 2005.47 Part of the observed inflation was due to the gradual 
adjustment of some tradable prices to the devaluation of 2002, which were still adjusting 
during 2004 and 2005. Another inflationary factor was the global rise in commodities 
prices, especially during 2007. However, evidence seems to suggest that inflation 
accelerated as an endogenous result derived from tightening conditions in the labor market 
and the (excessively) rapid expansion of demand in the non-tradable sector. The initial 
phase of rapid growth (from mid-2002 to mid-2004) occurred in a context of highly 
underutilized capacity and high unemployment and underemployment in the labor market. 
As the economy recuperated, aggregate investment reacted with high sensitivity to 
economic growth. Thus, with the exception of some particular sectors, capacity remained far 
45 A sterilization policy can be sustainable even if the domestic interest rate is moderately higher than the 
international rate adjusted by exchange rate variation. For a precise discussion on the sustainability condition, 
see Frenkel (2007).  
46 Since the Great Depression of the 1930s, this growth episode is only comparable with the performance 
between 1964 and 1974 commented on in section 3. See Albrieu and Fanelli (2009) for details.  
47 The CPI inflation rate was 6.1% in 2004, 12.3% in 2005 and 9.8% in 2006. In January 2007 the government 
introduced controversial methodological changes in the construction of the CPI index. Since then, the official 
figures have been systematically lower than private estimates. For instance, according to the private consulting 
firm Buenos Aires City, the CPI inflation rate for 2007 and 2008 was 25.7% and 23%, respectively, whereas the 
official estimates were 8% and 7%, respectively. 
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from fully utilized. However, the reduction of unemployment and underemployment, which 
changed from 17.3% and 17.1% in 2003 to 7.9% and 8.8% in 2008, contributed to the rise of 
nominal wages. In many sectors, this led to real wage increases far beyond productivity 
growth. For instance, in the manufacturing sector between the first quarter of 2003 and the 
last quarter of 2007, nominal wages rose 175% while average productivity per worker 
increased about 20%. The nominal average unit labor cost increased 130%. In the same 
period, manufacturing wholesale prices rose 50%.  
An aspect that deserves mention regarding the acceleration of inflation is the lack of 
coordination in macroeconomic policy. Given that monetary and exchange rate policies 
focus on preserving a SCRER – which was intended to put the economy on a high growth 
path – fiscal policy could have been used to moderate aggregate demand when inflationary 
pressures arose. On the contrary, public spending expanded well above the increase of tax 
revenues since 2006, which represented an expansionary fiscal impulse to already fast-
growing aggregate demand.  
Parallel to the acceleration of inflation, since early 2007 the management of economic policy 
suffered a gradual degradation. The general recognition that the government was 
manipulating the CPI (and later on other official statistics) triggered a process of capital 
outflow starting in mid-2007. Sovereign bonds that were issued in domestic currency during 
the debt restructuring of 2005 had an indexation clause to CPI inflation. The manipulation 
of the index was perceived as sort of default by the international financial community. The 
Argentine risk premium rapidly returned to the pre-restructuring levels (around 2000 basic 
points), after having reached 200 basic points in 2006. Another problematic episode 
occurred during the second quarter of 2008, when the government got into a severe dispute 
with the agricultural sector about the level of tax rates on agriculture exports. The official 
proposal of raising the tax rates did not get parliamentary approval. The episode eroded 
government’s popularity and added new sources of political and economic uncertainty. 
During the dispute, capital outflow intensified and by the time that the effects of the US 
subprime crisis reached emerging markets, the economy had already started to show signs 
of recession.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Probably the most important conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis is that the 
level of the RER has had a significant influence in the macroeconomic performance of Latin 
American countries. In particular, the experiences reviewed suggest that an excessively 
appreciated RER can lead to disastrous outcomes affecting short and medium term growth. 
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The experience in the region thus corroborates the consolidated view that overvalued RER 
have detrimental effects on economic growth (Easterly, 2005). The exchange rate regime 
choice may not be neutral in that regard. Our historical narrative illustrated how fixed and 
semi-fixed exchange rate regimes focused on price stabilization can lead to excessive RER 
appreciation and balance of payment and financial crises. The Southern Cone experiences 
of the late 1970s and that of Argentina during the 1990s, both reviewed in section 4, attest 
that crises can reach the dimension of great depressions. After these negative experiences, 
there seems to be agreement among Latin American macroeconomists and policy-makers 
that avoiding pronounced real appreciation should be a central objective of any 
macroeconomic policy. 
A second important lesson that emerges from our analyses is that in the process of 
integration to international financial markets, Latin American countries have gradually 
converged –through different national paths- towards the adoption of more flexible 
exchange rate regimes. Certainly, pegs have shown to be essential in providing a nominal 
anchor in contexts of high inflation or hyperinflation. But even in the cases that have been 
successful in conquering inflation, the phasing-out has proven to be traumatic, as the 
experiences of Argentina under the convertibility regime and Chile under the tablita best 
illustrate. Under conditions of moderately high inflation (say 30% per year), experience has 
shown that it is possible to reduce inflation gradually without using the exchange rate as 
an anchor. The case of Chile between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s -where the 
deceleration of inflation occurred in a context of rapid growth and robust external accounts- 
is a clear example of this. However, although a crawling bands regime is much more 
flexible than a currency board, both Chile and Colombia found that it lacked enough 
flexibility to deal with capital flows and by the late 1990s both countries shifted to more 
flexible regimes. 
Under conditions of low inflation, as has been the case of all major economies since the late 
1990s, flexibility has shown to be highly valuable. The lack of commitment to the level of 
the NER provides the economy flexibility to adjust to external shocks without resulting in 
reputational costs for the monetary authorities. The lack of commitment also eliminates the 
incentives of one-way bets in the FX market by speculators. In their portfolio choices 
between domestic and foreign assets (and liabilities), private agents have to assume the 
exchange rate risk. Therefore, a lower exposure to NER variations and lower financial 
fragility to external shocks is likely to be observed.  
Lack of commitment should not be understood as synonymous with pure floating. On the 
contrary, this is not the regime with the least degree of commitment. In both pure and 
managed floating, the monetary authority has no commitment regarding the level of the 
NER. However, in the former the central bank commits itself not to intervene in the FX 
market and to allow the NER to be determined by market forces. A managed floating 
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regime is more flexible because it allows the monetary authority to intervene whenever it 
considers necessary. This extra degree of freedom seems to be highly valued among Latin 
American central banks, since in their search for greater flexibility none of them adopted a 
pure floating regime. By the early 2000s, all central banks of the major countries in the 
region switched to managed floating regimes. These include not only the self-declared 
Argentinean managed floating, but also those of the FIT countries.  
The benefits of a managed floating regime are that it provides the same flexibility to absorb 
unexpected shocks as a pure floating regime, while also entitling the monetary authority to 
intervene in the FX market and influence the determination of the NER. In developing 
countries, this option is most dear given the potentially large effect of capital flows on the 
behavior of the NER and the importance of this relative price in the determination of other 
nominal and real variables. Central banks in developing countries may want to preserve 
the ability to influence the determination of the NER for two main reasons: 1) to reduce its 
volatility and avoid misalignments and 2) to induce its trend.  
Managed floating regimes in Latin America have been accompanied by a systematic and 
massive accumulation of FX reserves. This has not been a peculiarity of the region, but a 
common feature among developing countries since the post-Asian crises. As discussed in 
section 3, there have been two main explanations for this behavior: the precautionary and 
mercantilists views. Each of them is rooted in the motives for influencing the behavior of 
the NER mentioned above. According to the mercantilist view, reserve accumulation helps 
preserve a SCRER (at least in the medium-run), which is used to promote tradable 
activities. The precautionary view suggests that countries accumulate FX reserves to 
reduce NER volatility and prevent large swings in the exchange rate. Among major Latin 
American countries, Argentina is the most transparent example of reserve accumulation for 
mercantilist motives. In section 3, we explained why it would be misleading to classify 
reserve accumulation by the Latin American FIT countries as mercantilist. In our view, the 
motivation has been prevention.  
Why would countries accumulate FX reserves for precautionary motives? After the 
successive currency and financial crises during the 1990s, most economists and policy 
makers agree that capital flows can have destabilizing effects on exchange rates. These 
effects can take different forms. Capital movements can impinge excessive short run 
volatility on exchange rates or lead to long swings away from fundamentals. Central banks 
may want to prevent excessive short-run volatility in order to provide domestic agents a 
more stable relative price system and thus facilitate resource allocation. The rationale for 
preventing extended departures from fundamental levels is easier to understand, since 
substantive exchange rate misalignments usually come with high economic costs. 
Regarding this latter point, it is important to notice that prevention refers both to cases of 
excessive depreciation (i.e. overshooting) and appreciation (i.e. undershooting). The analysis 
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of reserves accumulation with precautionary motives has typically focused on the first effect 
and overlooked the second. 
In order to prevent non-fundamental runs against local currency, central banks need to 
dispose a certain volume of FX reserves. What is the optimal volume required for that 
purpose? As mentioned in section 3, several criteria have been suggested; the most popular 
indicating that FX reserves should be at least equal to the monetary base, M2, short-term 
foreign debt (i.e. the Greenspan-Guidotti doctrine), or 10% of GDP (i.e. the Jeanne-Ranciere 
guideline). The motivation of these criteria is ultimately to provide an indicator for an 
unobserved variable; namely, the volume of FX reserves that the public considers sufficient 
for the central bank to determine the NER. If this criterion is met -in other words, if the 
public believes that the central bank has enough reserves to satisfy the private demand for 
FX at the current NER- then betting on a future depreciation would not be profitable. Given 
that this optimal level is uncertain, central banks may have incentives to accumulate 
somewhat above conventional measures. However, even considering this reserve over-
accumulation bias, many studies have shown that accumulation, especially among Asian 
countries, has gone far beyond what any of these indicators suggest. Should this be 
interpreted as an indication that recent reserve accumulation has been driven by another 
motivation such as, for instance, the mercantilist strategy? Not necessarily. Conventional 
precautionary indicators specify the amount of FX reserves that are required to prevent a 
non-fundamental speculative attack or overshooting. Once that level (plus an extra amount 
due to uncertainty) is reached, central banks would not need to accumulate additional 
reserves to prevent a potential sudden stop. However, if in such situation they face a 
voluminous capital inflow that drives the exchange rate to excessively overvalued levels, 
they would feel forced to intervene in order to prevent non-fundamental appreciation 
pressures. This additional accumulation of reserves –that would take conventional 
indicators beyond optimal levels- would also be generated by precautionary motives. In this 
case, central banks would accumulate reserves to prevent an exchange rate undershooting. 
The excessive appreciation pressures that Latin American FIT countries faced since 2003 
led them to accumulate reserves, not to preserve a SCRER, but to prevent an exchange rate 
undershooting. This seems to be especially the case in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and to a 
lesser extent, Mexico. Their exchange rate regimes have mainly been oriented towards the 
achievement of low inflation, while avoiding unsustainable trends of the RER in both 
directions. Interventions in the FX market were useful for avoiding excessive depreciation 
between 1999 and 2002 and excessive appreciation during the booming period of 2003 to 
2008. Despite the interventions, the RER in these countries has tended to be more volatile 
and prone to appreciation than what is expected in a country following a SCRER strategy. 
The case of Peru is harder to classify. The managed floating regime has certainly 
maintained RER stability, but not at an especially competitive level. Peru shared the 
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motivations of the other FIT countries, but its managed floating with intense FX 
interventions has also been directed towards avoid RER volatility in order to preserve the 
stability of the highly dollarized domestic financial system. 
Reserve accumulation in Latin America has proven to be useful. There is little doubt that 
the large stocks of FX reserves –together with the greater NER flexibility– were essential to 
help central banks handle the impact of the international financial crisis of 2007-2008 
(Ocampo, 2009). Despite the skeptical assessment by many analysts (Rodrik, 2006) and 
even the IMF, it would be a hard task to persuade central banks in Latin American about 
the inefficiencies of accumulating FX reserves after this experience. 
The analysis in this paper has also presented evidence about the importance of using 
exchange rate policy to keep track of the behavior of the RER. Our historical narrative 
suggests that Latin American economies tended to perform better when the exchange rate 
policy managed to keep track –with different degrees of intensity- of the RER. In particular, 
some successful experiences of growth acceleration in the region have coincided with 
periods in which the exchange rate policy was purposely oriented towards preserving a 
SCRER. For instance, the arguably two most successful growth experiences in Latin 
America during the post World War II period have occurred in parallel with the 
implementation of exchange rate regimes targeting a SCRER. These experiences are the 
Brazilian miracle starting in the late 1960s simultaneous with the implementation of the 
crawling peg, and Chile’s experience with the crawling bands between the mid-1980s and 
mid-1990s. There are also other important cases in which this correlation between the 
exchange rate policy and economic performance is observed. These are the crawling pegs in 
Argentina and Colombia between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s and the managed floating 
in Argentina since 2002.48 Certainly, this observation should not be interpreted as 
indicating that exchange rate regimes targeting a SCRER are the explanation behind the 
success of these experiences. Economic growth and development are complex processes that 
involve the combination of many social, political and economic factors, most of which 
economists are still trying to understand. In any case, our historical narrative of exchange 
rate policies in Latin American supports the conclusion reached by a body of empirical 
studies mentioned in section 2, which indicate that an undervalued RER tends to foster 
economic growth in developing countries. In this regard, this paper suggests that the 
exchange rate policy can make an important contribution to economic development by 
preserving a SCRER. 
48 It is interesting to note that the first four of these cases are among the few experiences of growth 
accelerations identified by Haussmann et al (2005) in the Latin American region. The case of Argentina in the 
post convertibility period is not included in the authors’ sample but still meets their criteria to be labeled as 
episode of growth acceleration. See Albrieu and Fanelli (2008).  
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Policies oriented towards preserving a SCRER are not free from obstacles. The level of the 
RER, by determining the relative price of domestic and foreign goods, affects aggregate 
demand. Given the unemployment rate, aggregate demand affects the price level. A 
sustained excessively undervalued RER would ultimately lead to a rise in prices and 
therefore to a real appreciation. If the exchange rate policy tries to preserve the original 
RER level by devaluing the domestic currency, the strategy would lead to the acceleration 
of inflation. It is not unusual to find cases of policies that, in trying to preserve a SCRER, 
end up accelerating the inflation rate. Some of the experiences mentioned in this paper 
illustrate this point. During the years that the crawling peg was used in Colombia (1967-
1991), the inflation rate followed a soft but persistent upward trend. Argentina’s recent 
performance with the managed floating regime, in which the inflation rate accelerated 
significantly since 2007, is another eloquent example. It would be wrong, however, to 
conclude that this is an unavoidable result of any exchange rate policy focused on a SCRER. 
For instance, the inflation rate in Chile under the crawling bands regime decreased 
substantially.  
The experience of Chile between the mid 1980s and mid 1990s is an example of the 
macroeconomic coordination required to manage a SCRER policy. This policy configuration 
combined a crawling band regime, capital controls, countercyclical fiscal policy and an 
autonomous monetary policy with a reference interest rate as a policy tool. The combination 
of crawling bands, sterilized interventions and capital controls allowed the central bank to 
avoid the policy trilemma and simultaneously set the interest rate and the NER. Fiscal 
policy was used (although not always) to moderate aggregate demand pressures. With these 
policies –coupled with others focused on microeconomic aspects- the authorities managed to 
preserve a SCRER, reduce inflation, promote rapid growth of both exports and GDP, and 
avoid external and financial crises during turbulent periods. This successful trajectory 
lasted more than a decade.  
The strategy was abandoned because the authorities understood that the policy 
simultaneously targeting the NER and setting the interest rate was incompatible with 
financial integration. They interpreted that the quasi-fiscal cost due to sterilized 
interventions of about 0.5% of GDP was an indication that the policy would not be 
sustainable over time.49 The shift to a FIT regime was the option the authorities chose to 
provide macroeconomic policy the flexibility required to deal with international capital 
49 A common view in economics suggests that sterilized interventions can only be used in the short-run and are 
unsustainable for longer periods. Frenkel (2007) shows the conditions under which they are sustainable in the 
long run. Sterilizations can be unsustainable if they imply quasi-fiscal costs. In that case, their sustainability 
would depend on the overall fiscal balance and the growth rate of the economy. They would be perfectly 
sustainable if they manage to keep the public debt-GDP ratio stable around a level considered acceptable by 
creditors. The trade-off between costs and benefits of sterilized interventions should ultimately be decided by 
governments. Regarding the cost of sterilization in Chile in the mid 1990s, John Williamson (1996) pointed out: 
“[if paying 1%–1.5% of GDP] is the price of preserving a model that works, it would be cheap” (p. 30). 
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movements. With this new orientation, the preservation of the SCRER and capital controls 
were sacrificed. Another option would have been to shift to a managed floating regime and 
preserve the focus on the SCRER. Given that the preservation of this objective may have 
hindered monetary policy autonomy, the maintenance of capital controls would have 
probably been required.  
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Colombia 
Bilateral RER with the US, deflated by CPI indexes 
(Index 1 = average 1980-2008) 
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Mexico 
Bilateral RER with the US, deflated by CPI indexes 
(Index 1 = average 1980-2008) 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Ja
n‐
80
Ju
l‐8
1
Ja
n‐
83
Ju
l‐8
4
Ja
n‐
86
Ju
l‐8
7
Ja
n‐
89
Ju
l‐9
0
Ja
n‐
92
Ju
l‐9
3
Ja
n‐
95
Ju
l‐9
6
Ja
n‐
98
Ju
l‐9
9
Ja
n‐
01
Ju
l‐0
2
Ja
n‐
04
Ju
l‐0
5
Ja
n‐
07
Ju
l‐0
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peru 
Bilateral RER with the US, deflated by CPI indexes 
(Index 1 = average 1980-2008) 
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